



## Inequalities in a context of global recession: Perceptions, Framing and Politicization - May 26 – 28, 2011

### Introduction

Nonna Mayer: We will here explore inequalities in the North, in the South, and between the North and the South. Income inequalities have been on the rise in the 3/4 of OECD countries. Inequalities have been rapidly increasing in the last 20 years, and the recession has further widened the gap. And indeed, one cannot use the words “North” and “South any more, there are several Norths and several Souths (Pascal Lamy). This conference is an international and comparative session.

Laurence Tubiana: Perception of inequalities are much more accurate today. Income is an important aspect of the democratic debate. There is a strong feeling that the solutions to the crisis were to always support bankers, whereas the poor and the middle-class have been paying for it. It is a cross cutting issue for every society. The link between democracy and inequality is a challenge that we have to face.

Marie Duru-Bellat: Being concerned with issues of justice and inequalities is highly relevant in a globalized context. Of course, as the title of this seminar suggests – a context of global recession-, this is a headlines topic: justice and inequality issues become all the more relevant that we cannot anymore lazily hope that a global growth places all human beings in an equal situation, in the same way that the tide lifts up all the boats ...

Figures reflecting world inequalities, as we know, can truly give a feeling of dizziness. Data is overflowing. For instance, if one sets, as international institutions do, the poverty line at \$1.25 per day, 25 percent of the world population is poor, and if one sets the poverty line at \$2 a day then the part of the poor in the world population raises to almost a half (47 percent). And poverty and inequalities go alongside one another.

Inequalities have long been a challenge for political philosophy. Rawls for instance explicitly asks the question of “moral hazard”, the fact that the –unequal- fate of individuals depends on factors out of their control (talents, social origin, country of birth); with the joint question: is it fair to benefit from hazard? Rawls answered that it was sufficient that the advantages some enjoyed out of genetics or of any other sources be redistributed and thus eventually benefit also the underprivileged.

The “moral hazard” is not a fiction! We know, thanks to the work of economists such as Branko Milanovic, that about 80 percent of income inequalities among human beings can be explained by random factors such as, overwhelmingly, the country of birth (also called “birth premium”). It is the primary, massive source of inequalities.

Yet it is neither the most felt nor the most studied. In day-to-day life and for politicians in particular, when in our country the halt to the rise of the purchasing power is a burning issue, it would appear politically ill-timed to recall that we live in one of the world’s richest countries. It would seem like suggesting that we are, after all, not so badly off, and thus opening the door for those who would like to risk placing world poverty and inequalities against local poverty and inequalities. This can accompany a nationalist reaction, *a priori* a right-wing one: there are well enough poor at home that we don’t need to care for the poor in foreign countries. Or, more on the left-wing side: to deny the

responsibility other countries have in their own situation means acting as an old-fashioned neo-colonialist ...

Nonetheless, we cannot clear ourselves from any responsibility in the face of the poverty ruling in those faraway countries. Be it only because (without going back to history lessons) several of our policies may be generous within our borders but extremely harmful outside our borders, notably for the poorest countries. It is clear in some European budgetary decisions, which give agriculture subsidies equal to 6 times the total of aid allotted to poor countries for instance. We also know that some international trade or finance rules are particularly detrimental towards the poorest countries. And we must not forget the role of “structural adjustment plans” set up by international institutions, combining privatization, liberalization and deregulation: these plans have been recognized to have choked off economic growth, stirred up unemployment, and impoverished the poorest. We cannot therefore deny that rich countries have a part of responsibility in the misery of poor countries.

It is thus relevant to ask whether it is justified and fair to limit our feeling of responsibility to our family, our fellow citizens and that’s it – in short if it is relevant to neatly draw the limits of the borders within which we look at issues of justice. Or must we enlarge somehow those borders, feeling connected to all those we have contacts or economic exchanges with? We think about Europe, but why should we limit ourselves to Europe? What about inhabitants of the globe who live further away?

Several philosophers explicitly ask these kinds of questions, under the expression “global justice.” For a recent summary, see for instance Moellendorf Darrel (*Global Inequality Matters*, 2009). It presents notably the debates framed by Thomas Pogge (*World Poverty and Human Rights*, 2002). According to Pogge, a global egalitarianism can be “simply” justified by the dignity inherent in any human being. This is close to ideas Peter Singer and the cosmopolitan trend defend. Others, including philosophers, reject this notion of global inequality by arguing that countries do not belong to a common society within which individuals compare themselves to each other. This refers to social psychologists who show that “comparisons that do not appear appropriate have little psychological impact. Individuals will then consider that information given through comparison is not relevant for them”. (Guimond et al., 2008, quoted on the topic of men/women comparisons). The notion of inequality is always based on comparisons that are deemed relevant. We would in this case not be part of the same world (one of the main books on world inequalities by Branko Milanovic was entitled *World Apart*); and there would then be no universal justice standards that would apply to all human beings. Here, solidarity extends only to our fellow countrymen; the principles of justice that prevail at one specific moment are situated, they unfold only within a culture, a country, or even part of the society or a group (Michael Welzer). This position (multicultural, relativist) de facto recoups the nationalist position, which stresses that mutual obligations are to be defined within national borders.

The following days will not deal with political philosophy, and these questions will not be fully answered. But we can say that to dig in these issues, it is possible to explore (which is what this seminar offers, in many different ways) not only what is deemed fair/unfair but also how informed those judgements are, mobilizations as consequences of unfairness judgements... Those questions are complex, because one must go through successive steps requiring various methods and disciplines: one must obviously describe “objective” inequalities (a process less objective than it could seem at first sight), and quickly specify what is called an inequality by looking into perceived inequalities. Cognitive elements, knowledge, ways of story-telling or explaining these inequalities come into play in how inequalities are perceived. This results in an appraisal of inequalities and thus an appraisal of fairness judgements. It is only afterwards that one may expect political consequences of inequalities.

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## Alice Wuermli

### The (Re)production of (In)equalities: Poverty, Social Policy, and Human Development from Conception to Adulthood.

(Paper abstract)


This paper presents a comprehensive conceptual framework to analyse the effect of economic hardship, both permanent and transitory, on the developmental process of children and youth. This framework is an effort at bringing together economics with other social sciences, notably developmental psychology and sociology.

The policy domain in international development is dominated by economics. Enriching the policy dialogue by incorporating well-researched domains from other social sciences has the potential to enable human development policy to become more effective, investments in human development more sustainable, and long-run prosperity more attainable for a larger number of countries in this world, many of which are currently facing wide-spread poverty, high and rising rates of inequality, sluggish economic growth, and the resulting social unrest.

By integrating approaches, concepts, theory and evidence from a variety of disciplines this framework enables a nuanced understanding of factors and contexts that affect human development understood as complex processes of interrelated and interdependent systems and settings. Thus, this conceptual framework allows us to delve deeper into the human developmental process, and outlines and identifies vulnerabilities and protective factors during crucial years of a young person's development, by exploring the domains and developmental milestones that can be in jeopardy when exposed to the challenges caused by prolonged or temporary hardship (eg. economic crises). These years are critical both because of biological developments (e.g., the first three years after conception, the start of adolescence) and because of the high costs of later making-up for lost ground). In addition, recent developments in epigenetic research shows that heritable changes in phenotype or gene expressions can be caused by contextual, non-genetic factors and can remain for the rest of a person's life and even be transferred to the next generation, contributing to the often observed intergenerational transmission of poverty, and possibly rising inequality.

We believe that the context of aggregate economic crisis, such as the Great Recession, can produce a political economy context conducive to introducing "the right" policies. We've been able to observe such developments in several instances, for example Mexico and Colombia. Understanding the political economy of social policy further can inform the design of interventions to create the public support, and thus, the political viability of such programs (eg. Opportunity NYC).

The Biological Model (Bronfenbrenner 1976, 2006)



## Discussion

*On the specificities of the financial crisis*

Nicolas Sauger: The link between human development and the financial crisis. From the point of

view presented, the idea is that there's a crisis and we need to implement a new policy. However, there have always been poor people even before the crisis, and you still need to target them. The question is: is the crisis important because it makes it possible to implement new policies (by giving a political opportunity) or are there specific issues coming along with the crisis? Is it really a new issue and does it need to be tackled as such? So what's specific to the crisis and what's not specific ?

#### *On the evolution of World Bank policies*

Bruno Palier: At the end of the day, policy implications of the crisis described in this presentation are not different from what was said already 10 years ago. Such as the idea that redistribution makes people lazy. It is worth noting that in some countries who redistribute a lot, the shock has been less strong on people. Especially in terms of human shock, redistributing is crucial. Egalitarian societies who do not target specific people for their policies, are more successful to fight inequalities.

Michèle Lamont: You have to be at the table and enter the institution by the doors that are available.

Bruno Palier: How do you change ideas is an academic question. The issue is that the WB has contributed to the increase of world inequalities. After the 1997 crisis, there has been a backlash. Because of the Bank's structural adjustment programmes, countries had no more buffers to face the crisis. Developing countries felt unprepared and then decided to turn to more welfare policies. For the sake of the WB, the institution should listen to external views. Latin America is gathering money for itself to be autonomous from International Monetary Fund (IMF) and WB approaches. How do you change ideas? Although institutions, policies and governments do change incrementally, on the contrary ideas don't change incrementally. The WB has power through money, but it has even more power through ideas. The WB should make a revolution on the ideas level. A new paradigm fed by UNICEF and Nordic countries has been successful in reducing inequalities.

#### *On the measure of the crisis' impacts*

Nicolas Sauger: How to measure the policy efficacy of your proposals? How to measure the impact of the crisis as such? The presentation did not really offer a way to measure the efficacy and the impact of the policies. Do you have proposals for this ? The crisis may change ideas and values of individuals, the idea of measuring the total effect of the crisis is quite impossible. It has different dimensions and time-horizons. The issue might be to measure specific effects, disentangle the various effects of the crisis and the policies implemented to counter them.

Bruno Palier: The world is made of shocks and individuals. In between shocks and individuals, there are lots of systems. There are other theories about the individuals. The circled layers surrounding the individuals are not necessarily resources from which people can pick up. There are approaches that show that "choice" is actually forged by what the individual can find on the shelves around them. It is another way to see actors' behaviour.

Jessica Welburn : Economic shocks highlights pre-existing inequalities. The people more likely to be unemployed in normal times are now even more likely to be unemployed. How do you account for those kinds of micro-level issues? How do you see that various groups face different situations?

Jennifer Silva: How do you account for different impacts on the people living in a same household? How do you account for culture, in the sense of framing?

Elisa Reis: Shocks can be positive. Brazil benefited from the crisis. The difficult situation of the rest of the world made it easier for Brazil to increase incomes and expand credits. Thanks to a combination of a market situation and policy decisions.

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**Bruno Palier**

**The Age of Dualization : How Labour Market and Social Policies Create Inequalities in European Societies**

The OECD discovered in 2008 that there are inequalities. To put things bluntly, the OECD institution is aware of inequality increases, because inequalities may now start to become dangerous. This is based on the history of the welfare state. Advancements in the welfare state were built in pre-revolutionary moments. Social policies are often a way to avoid revolution – due to the fear that otherwise, without these policies, social unrest will blow up. If you look at the Maghreb, Spain, Greece: the times look like we are in a pre-revolutionary phase in the Western world.

OECD, IMF officials are the ones who have promoted specific policies in the 1990s like the structural adjustment plans. And now the same people say that inequalities are dangerous. But they cannot understand why inequalities increase, because they are part of the explanation.

The debate now is not about measuring inequalities but explaining them. The three main suspects according to the economic field to explain inequalities' rises are globalization, technical change and intergenerational imbalances. So economics do not involve any human agencies, no policies... Inequalities would just be happening, through external factors.

But we can fight inequalities, which means that policies matter.

The project presented here focuses on European and Western countries. It tries to give explanations for the increase of some inequalities within the OECD world. How come the top 0.1% of people make so much money? Because of favourable fiscal policies. And those fiscal policies come from an economic ideology. It's been proven that the trickle-down effect doesn't work and that we do need re-distributive policies. The trickle down effect postulate is the explanation behind existing fiscal exemptions.

Here we'll speak of inequalities in labour markets. What jobs do people get, what kind of social protection? There has been an increase of inequalities in people's protection. This can be analysed as a trend towards a further dualization between insiders and outsiders.

### *Research questions*

Why are we growing unequal? Who are the losers (outsiders)? What's their gender, ethnic origin, etc. Why do we see new and increasing insider/outsider divides nowadays compared to 20 years ago? Why are these divides deeper in some countries than in others? How are policies contributing to increasing / or decreasing inequalities? What are the politics of dualization (who are the actors)?

Dualization is a process, a dynamic. It means when you treat different groups differently. As far as the labour market and the welfare state is concerned, there is a different treatment of insiders and outsiders. These different treatments can lead to different outcomes, more or less inequalities. It can lead to institutional dualisms (good school / bad school). Or amplify the existing institutional dualism. But dualization also means targeting the poor with specific policies.

### *Who are the outsiders?*

To determine who is an outsider, one needs to look at people's position in the labour market. If you are unemployed, you are likely to be an outsider. When the rate of unemployment in a specific groups is higher than for the whole population, then this group is likely to encompass outsiders. "Atypical employment" counts as well, to speak of low levels of pay, low level of social benefits, and low level of employment protection (short term contracts, interim, part-time...). However, all these categories have to be specified: short term contracts may give lots of money (actors for instance). Those jobs are the first touched by the crisis.

There are more outsiders in OECD countries. Level of unemployment has increased. Also, the share of atypical employment in the OECD workforce has grown from around 10 percent to 25-35 percent. So we cannot call it atypical any more! The notion of "atypicality" reflects the social tension between insiders and outsiders, rather than the proportion of atypical employment.

Who are the outsiders? Some societal groups are over-represented among outsiders in all countries studied: women, young labour market participants, low skilled workers, immigrants and workers of migrant origin. These groups are more likely to suffer from insufficient social rights. The available evidence suggests that this is persistent over time.

There are important variations between countries. Welfare regimes matter a lot in structuring who is

or not an outsider. Liberal welfare regimes account for the highest share of labour market and social protection of outsiders in Western democracies, followed by Continental, Northern and Southern Europe. Southern Europe is more homogeneous in terms of numbers. The outsiders are not exactly the same in the various regimes. In Nordic and Continental countries, gender is the main dimension. While in Southern Europe, outsidership concerns mostly young labour market participants. More than 40% of the youth are unemployed in Spain. And in the Anglo-Saxon countries, outsiders are predominantly low-skilled. Only immigrants seem to be an important source of cheap labour in all countries.

#### *Mechanisms: the role of labour market and social policies*

You can understand these differences by looking at specific policies and reforms. Partly, increases in outsidership come from the way some countries have implemented WB and IMF recipes. Germany, France and other continental European countries have done a partial liberalization. The way neoliberalism has been implemented matters.

These insider / outsider divides are not a straightforward consequence of globalization, etc. but rather the result of policies, i.e. of political choice. Impacts of the shock change according to the way it is coped with by policies already implemented. The policies are the results of political processes in which governments make deliberate choices in favour or against outsiders.

Dualization comes from policies that increasingly differentiate rights, entitlements, and services provided to different categories of recipients. If you have an atypical work, you get less rights. So the position of insiders may remain constant, while only the position of outsiders deteriorates. Or you may have new policies trying to deal with these people who are not in the labour market.

#### *A basic economic logic, various paths to dualization*

There's a basic economic logic which has led to different paths. The governments of the countries studied here aimed at protecting what was the most important for their system. This was the old good industry and the workers. For instance today, Germany still exports big cars, tool machines, as in the 1980s. They saved their industry.

We can show that the labour market and welfare state policies have been inspired by the neoliberal agenda. This stands also for social protection: spendings should be diminished because it's too costly. But this neoliberal agenda has been only partially implemented, to some parts of the workforce but not others. Why was the implementation of the neoliberal agenda only partial? Because governments wanted to save what was more important for our social and economic system, the industry. Germany, France, South Korea, Japan, have known a golden era after the 2<sup>nd</sup> world war, which led to a big public sector in France, big plants in Germany and Japan. In the face of the economic shocks, the aim was to protect the system, hoping that through a trickle-down effect, the whole society would be preserved. How to do so? You save industries by making them cheaper to confront globalization. Globalization means that others did the same thing but in a cheaper way.

The UK turned to doing something else, financial capitalism. In California as well, with the development of the silicon valley. But in France, Germany and Japan, the objective was to do the same thing as before, but cheaper. In Germany, there were no wage increase, in France the idea was to work tougher and tougher.

And the welfare state? There was a general decrease in social protection. For some the retrenchment of the welfare state was compensated (insiders), for others it was not (outsiders).

## **Discussion**

### *On the insider / outsider dichotomy*

Nicolas Sauger: Is it really about insiders versus outsiders? There is not necessarily an opposition between them. It is a conflict and a competition between different groups. Why simplify social cleavages in one single cleavage between outsiders and insiders? To some extent you assume that you have two separate distinct groups. But are there in-between groups? If there is a continuum

rather than a dichotomy, we can also ask how the coalition of social groups are made in a country?  
Nonna Mayer: On the issue of dichotomy. Why not use a continuous variable, that would measure the degree of outsidersness? What you measure here is the potentiality to be an outsider, so it is not the same thing. Is it an “and” or a “or”? Do you have compensating factors such as family ties, intergenerational help, assets, property, networks, etc.

Michèle Lamont: The mechanisms that you discuss that lead to dualization, are mechanisms that lead to social boundaries. But here cultural membership misses from the global picture. You can get around the insider/outsider dichotomy by talking about ideal-type. Look at the opposition against immigrants in some societies. Immigrants are rejected because of several dimensions (phenotype, religion)? People can be outsiders for different reasons. It is possible to make the analysis more multi-dimensional, by looking not only at redistribution but also at multiculturalism. If we want to analyse processes and causation, we need the full picture and culture is absent.

Bruno Palier: The continuum argument does not hold because politics and policies are not made out of continuum but out of differentiation. When looking at labour market reforms and social protection reforms, most of them mean drawing lines. These lines run between those who have contributed enough and those who have not. It is not a continuum, it's either/or. The dichotomy holds in the dualization. The term “divide” keeps the idea that there are many lines in the society. A lot of outsiders are the spouses of insiders for instance.

#### *On the agency / structure debate*

Nicolas Sauger: Most countries follow a same path with the same consequences. So where is the actual choice? If the previous structural choice is set, then it is just “bad luck” for the next generation. This is all the more problematic that you can predict that countries with the highest number of outsiders are the ones that do not change much.

Joshua Guetzkow: The four countries you are focused on made similar choices and had similar outcomes. What is the alternative? Is there a country that followed a different path with less dualization? Or would everybody be worse off if these four countries had not chosen these policies?

Bruno Palier: The big driver of differences is unions. In some countries where the rate of unionization is low (with male, industrial workers) there is dualization. In some countries where unions include women also, then there is a shift with less dualization. The counterfactual case are the Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland. There you see that the composition of unions is important. Also, the political system matters. In most coalition governments there is a pivotal party speaking in the name of outsiders. But in majoritarian system, outsiders are not so much taken into account. Some little parties in Switzerland or the Netherlands speak for single women for instance.

#### *On advocating for equality*

Marie Duru-Bellat: The presentation could make a stronger case for equality. Equality is good for society itself. It should be defended, as equality is not a consensual issue. Also, to broaden the scope of the study, highlight that globalization changes the frontiers between insiders and outsiders.

Bruno Palier: What is important is to call for less inequality, rather than for equality, in the political discourse. You can have equal investment in people (education, health care). The idea is not everybody would earn the same but that everybody has the same school, the same equality of housing, etc. We need to differentiate between income equality and similar social public basic services. The latest should be egalitarian.

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### **Joshua Guetzkow**

**Common Cause? The cultural connections between prisons and welfare 1960 – 1996  
Discursive connexions between criminal justice and welfare policies.**

What is the connexion between criminal justice and welfare policy? Don't seem directly related. Prison punishes criminals, welfare helps the poor. Yet, they are both forms of social control. When unemployment is high, prisons swell to deter the unemployed from crime. Social welfare efforts usually expand before unrest outbreaks. Governments tend to favour either welfare or prison. This is a finding that applies to OECD countries. Governments with bigger welfare policies imprison a smaller share of the population. What is interesting is that this relationship holds after you control for poverty and for crime rates. How do we understand this contrary relationship between prison and welfare?

The comparison of Congressional hearings on the problems of poverty and crime has provided insight into the relationship between welfare and criminal justice policymaking. In the 1960s, poverty and crime were both perceived to be caused by the breakdown of the community, itself the result of blocked and limited opportunities. In the 1980s, and even more so in the 1990s, poverty and crime were both perceived to be caused by the breakdown of the family, itself the result of the generosity of the welfare system. The poor and criminals in the 1960s were constructed as hopeless, helpless victims of discrimination and economic transformations; in the 1980s and 1990s, the poor and criminals were viewed as rational actors who lacked the family values that would guide them to make the right choices. In the 1960s, society was to blame for poverty and crime, and it was government's duty to help by instilling hope, providing skills and rebuilding communities; in the 1980s and 1990s, individuals were to blame for poverty and crime, and it was government's task to enforce and impose the right values by helping—in fact, forcing—people to help themselves. In both periods, the understanding of the how the perceived causes of poverty and crime were related to policy solutions was improved by examining ideas about the poor and criminals. The ideas provide a bridge that links the causes of poverty and crime to specific policy instruments, as well as the broader outlines of policy. For example, when juvenile delinquents growing up in impoverished communities were viewed as lacking respect for authority rather than hope and dignity, the proposed policy solution was premised on the notion that government needed to “impose responsibility.”

The dominant tendency among all states has been towards welfare cutbacks and prison expansion.

## **Discussion**

### *On political benefits of crime*

Nicolas Sauger: Under the Thatcher cabinet in the UK, policies were leading to an increase of the number of poor people. And this was leading to an increase in crime and then to an increase of the conservative vote. Because the conservative party was seen as tackling the crime issue. There was a strategy in the Thatcher cabinet to increase crime so that they could keep the upper hand on the agenda.

Nonna Mayer: Use an economic model to see why politicians want to use this kind of measure as far as redistribution is concerned. They took into account the xenophobia of the voters. They applied this to the European context. It's a way to look at the political calculus of politicians.

### *On furthering sanction policies*

#### Alice Wuermli:

Developmental psychologists talk about self-regulation, in a developmental sense. Self-regulation is one of the tasks that need to be learned throughout childhood to adulthood. You can predict behaviour at an early age. Wild behaviour begins at the age of 4 or 5. So if it was possible to integrate child development issues in the public discourse, then it could possibly change violent behaviour. Late risk behaviour has a lot to do with investments in childhood.

### *On the evolution of discourses*

Nicolas Sauger: From a European point of view, crime is identified with right wing voters and welfare policies are identified with left wing voters. What would be nice to see in this study is how

this consensus was transformed from the 1960s to the 1990s. There is a change in discourse, so how did this occur and why?

Bruno Palier: We should not merge neo-conservatives and neo-liberals. Bush was both a neoliberal and a neo-conservative. They can add themselves. Punishing crimes and punishing the lazy poor is based on the rational-choice ideology. People make choices among incentives, such as the generosity of the welfare system, or the sanctions when breaking the law. If people are rational, then you make policies with incentives to influence on their behaviour. In the US and in the UK, neoliberalism has been associated with neo-conservatism, but it was not the case in New Zealand and in Australia.

Nissim Mizrachi: When does government use the rational agent framework, when does it not?

Hanna Herzog: Do people assume that there is one logic leading culture? In the American culture, you have two contradictory elements. You have on the one hand the individuality and individual responsibility, and the community on the other. When is the community used to explain the behaviour and the results of policies?

Joshua Guetzkow:

Are the ideas changing, or is the people talking who are changing? We can separate neoliberalism and neo-conservatism in reality and analytically. Recent scholarship has shown neoliberal paternalism. In terms of talking about rational choice: if individuals were only acting rationally then you can only offer them positive incentives or sanctions. Why is it that the policies proposed are punishments? It's a hybrid conception of the people: they are rational but they lack values.

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Session 2: Compared perceptions of inequalities and justice (Friday May 27, 2011)

### **Marie Duru-Bellat – Elise Tenret**

#### **La perception des inégalités dans un monde globalisé**

La manière dont nous percevons les inégalités est un paramètre important de la cohésion des sociétés. Une hypothèse est que la vie politique d'un pays est marquée par la perception qu'ont les gens des inégalités et la manière dont ils les expliquent.

La recherche montre qu'il faut distinguer les inégalités, les réalités économiques elles-mêmes, de la manière dont elles sont perçues. Il y a souvent un écart entre les réalités et ce qu'on en perçoit. Néanmoins, les perceptions ne sont pas sans rapport avec la réalité. Une des questions est de savoir si les gens cantonnent leur jugement à leur propre pays ou si on assiste à une mondialisation des perceptions. En particulier parce qu'ils sont bien informés, les gens sont davantage conscients des problèmes de la planète.

La majorité des personnes interviewées dans tous les pays pensent que les inégalités sont trop importantes. Ce type de réponse est d'autant plus marqué que le pays du répondant est riche.

Mais la disparité des réponses sur les inégalités vient-elle de normes culturelles? Ceci amènerait à souligner une exception américaine ou des pays d'Europe centrale. Une autre piste est que ces jugements sur les inégalités dépendent du développement économique du pays. On serait plus tolérant avec la pauvreté dans les pays riches, ce qui serait la preuve d'un optimisme sur l'évolution de la société. La croissance finira bien par estomper les inégalités. Dans ce cas là, les pays pauvres seraient simplement en retard.

Si on cherche à comprendre la variété des réponses sur l'importance des inégalités, ce qui compte le plus, c'est la manière dont on juge les inégalités dans son propre pays. On appliquerait les normes culturelles que l'on applique au niveau national aussi à l'échelle du monde. Mais le niveau de richesse de l'interviewé joue également.

Enquête du *World Value Survey* en 2005. La limite de cette enquête vient du fait qu'elle ne contenait pas de questions sur les inégalités en tant que telles mais sur la pauvreté. L'étude soumet aux gens une liste des possibles problèmes mondiaux et demande quel problème ils jugent le plus grave pour

le monde entier. Au premier rang vient la pauvreté comme problème le plus important dans le monde. Mais il faut aussi tenir compte des autres problèmes proposés.

#### *Niveau moyen de jugement en fonction des pays*

Il y a un consensus dans les 2/3 des pays, où la pauvreté est citée par les personnes à hauteur de 80% des répondants, soit en rang 1 soit en rang 2. Mais la diversité est importante selon les pays. Par exemple, les Japonais mettent moins en avant la pauvreté. En Géorgie, 84% des gens pensent que c'est le plus important.

Quels sont les pays le plus sensible à la pauvreté? Ceux qui mettent le moins en avant sont les pays asiatiques (Japon, Corée), les pays d'Amérique du nord, mais aussi plusieurs pays d'Afrique subsaharienne (Mali, Ethiopie, Burkina). Les plus sensibles à la pauvreté sont l'Amérique Latine, l'Asie du sud-est, le Moyen-Orient, les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale.

On ne peut isoler la pauvreté des autres problèmes mis en avant, mais la pauvreté reste de loin la réponse la plus choisie. La pollution est plutôt soulignée dans les pays riches, les difficultés sanitaires plutôt dans les pays pauvres. Ceci suggère que les gens répondent en fonction des problèmes importants dans leur propre pays. Il y a des corrélations très importantes entre les réponses nationales et "globales". Les gens projettent à l'échelle du globe les problèmes qu'ils perçoivent dans leurs propres pays.

#### *Les caractéristiques macro-économiques des pays*

Est-ce que dans au niveau national la pauvreté est importante, et est-ce que ceci peut influencer les représentations? Un premier résultat est que ce sont davantage les pays pauvres qui citent la pauvreté comme le problème le plus important.

Selon le niveau de PIB, certaines valeurs individuelles sont différemment réparties. Dans les pays riches les individus se considèrent plus comme citoyens du monde et sont davantage favorables à la redistribution.

#### *Les caractéristiques personnelles: le niveau micro-social.*

Trois types de variables sont pris en compte: la position sociale, le niveau de connaissances, et les valeurs. Ce sont les individus les plus riches qui citent moins la pauvreté comme quelque chose d'important. De même pour l'éducation, les plus diplômés citent moins la pauvreté comme un problème important. Il y a en revanche un effet de l'âge, les personnes les plus âgées sont plus sensibles à la question de la pauvreté.

Mais les jugements quant à la pauvreté sont mieux expliqués par les variables de valeurs, Notamment à travers l'échelle politique, les personnes plus à droite ont moins tendance à citer la pauvreté comme un problème important au niveau mondial.

Enfin, la variable qui joue le plus au niveau individuel, est le fait d'avoir cité la pauvreté comme importante au niveau national. Si la pauvreté est vue comme importante au niveau national, alors elle est vue aussi importante au niveau mondial.

#### *Analyse multi niveaux*

Que se passe-t-il si on regarde les niveaux micro et macro ensemble? Le premier enseignement est que l'on a une variance beaucoup plus importante entre les individus d'un même pays qu'entre les pays. Les attitudes varient beaucoup plus au niveau domestique qu'au niveau international. Mais ici le PIB devient une variable positive. C'est à dire que lorsque la variable macro est contrôlée par les variables individuelles, elle change de sens. Plus le PIB est important, plus les gens sont sensibilisés à la question de la pauvreté.

Sur le modèle multi-niveau, on explique mal la variance inter-pays et mieux la variance intra-pays.

#### *Conclusion*

Ne pas citer la pauvreté ce n'est pas forcément un désintérêt pour la pauvreté, puisqu'il y avait d'autres problèmes proposés dans le questionnaire. On explique mal ce qui se passe au niveau des

pays, mais mieux ce qui se passe au niveau individuel. Il serait intéressant de caractériser plus finement les différences au sein du pays. La perception de la pauvreté ou des inégalités a des incidences politiques car ça influence la manière dont les individus voient les politiques de redistribution à l'échelle nationale ou internationale.

## **Discussion:**

### *On countries that are seen as exceptions*

Alain Chenu: In this type of research you are always doing a safari type research, a high-sight research. It is hard to see everything from so far, hard to see the details of the national paths in the construction of public problems in every country. Norway for instance is not an exception. Because it is a social democratic country, it implies that even the rich Norwegian are involved in problems of under development and problems of poor countries. There is a tradition of interest in the fight against poverty nationally and internationally. This type of situation are not an exception. It is normal than Norway would respond more against poverty than the United States. So could you include in your model the type of welfare state in every country, it would improve the variance.

Marie Duru Bellat: Those broad surveys are only a first step. They draw a landscape. What appear as exceptions, then we need to focus on them. But without such a first look, we cannot identify who are the exceptions.

### *On income levels*

Alain Chenu: There is an asymmetry between poverty and wealth. About poverty there's an old debate between absolute / relative poverty. But the same debate does not exist about rich people. Rich people are usually considered as rich because they have wealth in itself. The relative characteristic is not decent to define. People feel it's obscene to say that you are rich because you are richer than others. Jules Renard said: "*It's good to be happy but it's still better when others are not*". But it would mean being a social sadist to say that ! In moral terms it's not the same than with relative poverty. Another difference: when you are very rich and you're uncomfortable that you're rich, you can give your money to someone else. You can't do this when you're poor ! This asymmetry is tied to Jules Renard's point. We have to see the moral implications of belonging to the upper side of the distribution of wealth and being at the bottom. In some countries, US for instance, scores a low responding rate of poverty relevance, people feel they deserve being rich, whereas in Norway people may feel guilty of being rich.

Elisa Reis: In Brazil, about the income levels, wealthy people think that what most influences success is luck. Lower-class people think that what most influences success is hard work.

Marie Duru Bellat: Poverty is somehow more objective than inequality. In the next step, we will put together data about inequality and poverty. It is surprising that in Brazil, elites put luck in the first place. In all Western countries, dominant people are more inclined to say that the world is just, so that one deserves what one has.

### *On methodological issues*

Elisa Reis: Is the distinction between a cultural explanation and a modernist explanation a good distinction ? Both explanations could be cultural: modernization could be an homogenization of cultures.

Nonna Mayer: A problem would be representativeness of the sample. More often than not, the poor people are just not interviewed in this type of survey.

Michèle Lamont: How do you classify the clusters of countries? Why would certain countries be put together while others would not? You could use the welfare regimes, the models of development, or geographic labels without presuming they are unified culturally.

Marie Duru-Bellat: We have thought to introduce the regime according to the data, but it is not cultural at this stage.

Frederic Gonthier: The way the question are labelled and the way poverty was formulated could

influence the results. How was the term poverty translated in Japanese or Brazil? In English, there are two words, “poverty” which has a qualitative perspective and “poorness” which has a quantitative perspective. Poverty somehow is an ethnocentric term. It comes also from the way the welfare state structures perceptions of people. Could the differences between countries be linked to different translations?

*On the impact of religion*

Nonna Mayer: Can you develop more about religion?

Elise Tenret: Religion made no difference on the macro-level. But at the micro-level, the fact of being religious has an impact on the sensibility to poverty.

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## **Frederic Gonthier**

### **Explaining the changing attitudes of Europeans towards economic liberalism and inequalities**

Europeans are becoming anti liberals. Here, the presentation will deal only with economic liberalism.

There have been lots of demonstrations in Europe. The media usually say that these demonstrations are linked to the recession of 2008, and jump to the conclusion that the crisis is the cause of a growing anti-liberalism feeling in Europe. This analysis reduces anti liberalism to an epiphenomenon. It relies on the illusion that social phenomenon are cyclical, are part of the short-term history and of the “radical originality of the present”. Here we will try to show that anti-liberalism is a deeper phenomenon. It did not begin in 2007 but it emerged at the beginning of the 1990s.

There are several issues at stake. Are European becoming anti-liberals? This question can be decomposed. How can we measure anti-liberalism? How did it evolve since 1990?

Is anti-liberalism an homogeneous attitude? Can it be reduced to a few elementary dimensions? Can we observe national specificities? Is there a relation between these dimensions and individual characteristics and to political variables? Do inter-countries variations of anti-liberal attitudes mainly rely on differences between countries or on differences between social groups and individuals? To what extent are these differences linked to the evolution of inequalities inside the countries?

The survey used is the the European Values Study. The analysis was made on 27 countries of the European Union. They are regrouped into 4 different areas (Northern, Western, Southern and Eastern Europe).

Different elements suggest that anti-liberal attitudes have been growing. The question about confidence in trade unions and in major companies showed a decrease of confidence in major companies and an increase of the confidence in trade unions. Almost 2/3 of Europeans remain confident in institutions that represent the welfare state. In contradicts the general idea of crisis of confidence in public institutions. Everything points out that confidence in state social functions is increasing in a rather uniform way. The hypothesis is that this progress of confidence is linked to the general feeling that inequalities have progressed and that the welfare state is a legitimate actor to deal with inequalities.

Another question is the compared attachment to equality and freedom. An indicator measures the evolution of the underlying values of economic and social attitudes. Between 1990 and 2008, we see a strong progress of the attachment to equality. Europeans today are 42% to declare preferring inequality to freedom. The variations between European countries compared to the variations inside European countries are more important today than in 1990. Between 1990 and 2008, Europeans have become more attached to equality, and the diversity of opinions between countries has increased. This result contradicts the idea of value convergence between countries. According to

post-materialist theories, people in countries with the same level of development would have the same system of value. Western and Southern Europe are more in favour of equality than Eastern & Northern Europe.

Another indicator of anti-liberalism is the question concerning the needs for reforms or revolutionary actions. 79% of Europeans consider that society must be changed through gradual reforms, and 11% prefer revolutionary actions. The reform answer has been decreasing since 1999 and the revolutionary answer has been increasing since 1999.

The main trend is that liberal preferences concerning economy have clearly declined between 1990 and 2008. 2 doctrinal pillars of economic liberalism loose up to 15 points of percentage between 1990 and 2008. Europeans are only 34 percent to think that the state should give more freedom to firms. The opinion according to which competition is good and stimulates people to work hard also looses up to 10 points of percentage since 1990. These 2 items cover different dimensions. It first shows a growing disaffection of Europeans for the free market as an optimal model of resources allocation.

National specificities appear more clearly when we take one by one the questions. In all European countries, favourable opinions for private ownership have declined. Preferences for private ownership has especially decreased in Northern and Eastern countries. In Western European countries (Portugal, Italy, France) the regression is less important. The same observation can be made about competition. The idea that competition is good has decreased for all countries (except of them, among which the United Kingdom).

The idea of individual responsibility tends to step back both in conservative continental countries (Austria, Italy, Belgium, France) and in social democratic countries (Denmark Sweden, Finland). But this idea tends to progress in liberal models (the UK). The global pattern is very similar if we look at the question about unemployed people. Should unemployed people should take any job available? The number of positive responses increases in Northern and Eastern countries.

To get the global image we need to add all these items and make comparisons, to make up a "liberalism index". The analysis distinguishes between different dimensions of liberalism. The progression of anti-liberalism conceals very different trends.

The first dimensions is the interventionism dimension. The second dimension is called regulationism (it is linked to confidence in state social functions, in trade unions and in major companies). The third dimension is egalitarianism. The fourth dimension is radicality (it is mostly characterized by items on revolutionary actions and the right for unemployed persons to refuse any job.). There are four models, for each anti-liberal attitude.

What are the significant parameters for each model dimension? Gender has a significant effect on interventionism and egalitarianism. Women are more disposed than men to endorse these two attitudes. But the effect of gender on regulationism is less significant, as well as for radicality. Men tend to be more radical than women.

Age has no significant effect on interventionism nor on regulationism. But is significantly linked to radicality and to egalitarianism. It means that the probability of adopting a radical attitude decreases with the age of the respondent.

The educational level is not related to interventionism but is negatively related both with regulationism and egalitarianism, and positively linked with radicality. The less you are educated the more you are egalitarian, the more you are educated the more you are radical.

Political variables are significantly linked to all dimensions.

### *Conclusions*

Anti-liberalism has progressed in the EU. But anti-liberalism is a composite phenomenon that refers at least to 4 distinct dimensions. We can see that people who endorse anti-liberal attitudes have similar characteristics. Their responses are more intensively related with their economical and political situation than with the country they live in. This could lead to the conclusion that the

relation between individual characteristics and anti-liberal attitudes are indifferent to variation between countries. They transcend cultural differences. This implies that objective inequalities grasped at the micro-level of individual situations have more impact on subjective inequalities expressed through anti-liberal attitudes, than the objective attitudes observed at the macro level.

## **Discussion**

### *On the influence of EU institutions*

Alain Chenu: You put aside the point that in most European countries, the participation in European elections has declined. It may be linked with the point that the diversity of opinions has increased in a cross country perspective. The EU institutions exist more and more but their place in the focus of interest of citizens may be quite declining. That may be linked with the other point about the fact that people give more and more importance to state regulation. What type of state regulation? On what scale is public intervention required? There's more interest in the possibility of intervention at the national scale.

### *On public discourses about economic liberalism*

Jennifer Silva: Has the popular discourse in the media changed about economic liberalism?

Frédéric Gonthier: There was no particular question on media in the survey. Regarding more structural effects, what is interesting is the evolution of the poverty rate. We can interpret this change of values as a backlash to the evolution of economic situations.

Frédéric Gonthier: The public discourses or media discourses have an impact on opinions on individual responsibility and on confrontation to the labour market. What is interesting in the European value survey is that they ask on opinion about labour and work. People tend to attach more importance to social coercive norms regarding work. This may be tied to the impact of public discourse about dependency on public systems.

### *On voting consequences*

Nonna Mayer: European institutions are important. Why? As long as Europe was something very vague there were positive attitudes towards Europe. Since the Maastricht treaty, there has been more opposition. Is it because there is a new cleavage? The extreme right and extreme left reject Europe. Does it matter? If we have a decline of support for economic liberalism, then at first sight you should reject right wing parties? And it's exactly the opposite. Economic liberalism has less and less impact on voting. There's something to look at in this statement.

Laurence Tubiana: Is there more anti-liberal feeling and less voting? Is there a difference between elite thinking and more global public thinking?

Frédéric Gonthier: When we introduce in the models political characteristics, they have globally significant effects on the 4 dimensions. The more Europeans declare themselves left-wing, the more they are in favour of interventionism, egalitarianism and radicality. The interest in politics is positively related to egalitarianism, positively related to regulationism and positively related to radicality, but not related to interventionism.

Elisa Reis: Did you try to correlate electoral results? It would be relatively easy to confront a national election with each of your four models.

### *On the influence of immigration*

Nissim Mizrachi: What about the changes in each country's ethnic composition? How does this affect results? How does migration affect overall change in public attitudes?

Frédéric Gonthier: The next step would be which country explains the variance, etc., and to take into account independent variables that are more directly linked to socio economical channels and also the evolution of migrations. The data sets allow to consider attitudes towards migrants. It could be linked to the evolution of public discourses on the issue.

*On gender issues*

Alain Chenu: You mention that women are more regulationist than men. Why? They belong more than men to public service jobs? What causes are behind this difference?

Michèle Lamont : On the differences between men and women, you may use the literature on care, solidarity. Women have greater fragility on the labour market, and maybe more the culture of care.

Frédéric Gonthier: One hypothesis could be that men tend more than women to associate inequality with public affairs and therefore with state intervention. But women tend more to associate inequality with private affairs.

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## **Leslie McCall**

### **The (Un)deserving rich**

#### **American beliefs about opportunity and inequality in the era of rising inequality**

What happened over time with public perception of inequality? There are huge differences in pay between a CEO and a common labourer, or between a professor at the top of the scale and an instructor. But what is seen as fair? According to Daniel Bell, this will be the most vexing question in a post industrial society. (*The post-industrial society*, 1973).

In the US you have criticism on the lack of a fulfilled meritocracy. Has the society achieved meritocracy? But what about the redistribution of rewards? No one asks this last question. This is different from the issue of opportunity. Daniel Bell looks how opportunity and inequality are related to each other. When asked what is more important between reducing inequalities or ensuring that everyone has a fair chance to improve their situation, 71% of interviewees prefer equal opportunity. But rarely asked is the following question: “does greater inequality means that it's more difficult for the people at the bottom ladder to move up the ladder?” The way this is formulated is not an opposition between opportunity and inequality. 71% of interviewees agree that inequalities are a barrier for equal opportunity. The argument here is that the extent to which US people are concerned about inequalities is related to how it impedes opportunity. This has policy implications.

It cannot be inferred that Americans do not care about restricted opportunities or income inequality from their belief that hard work is important for getting ahead. These beliefs are, at best, weakly related to one another. Americans (1) believe that social advantages are important in getting ahead, i.e., that opportunities are restricted, and (2) connect these social advantages to unequal outcomes. The specific connection made between social advantages in getting ahead and the capacity of the rich to maintain inequality is a description of the intergenerational reproduction of inequality. However, Americans do not think this aspect of income inequality harms prosperity. Is this consistent with “system justification” theories, i.e., that this type of inequality doesn't interfere significantly in economic growth?

Americans believe that executives make more than they deserve (the “undeserving rich”), workers make less than they deserve, and occupational pay inequality is much greater than it should be (i.e., should be reduced by at least a third). This is long known, however. These violations of “just deserts” norms are strongly connected with beliefs about income inequality as excessive, benefiting the rich, and unnecessary for prosperity.

The specific connection made between unfair pay and reduced prosperity is a description of how unfair pay inequalities can reflect (or trigger) the restriction of broader “rising tide” opportunities.

To sum up, Americans believe that opportunity is based on more than individual effort. Opportunity is constrained by unfair social advantages and unfair pay. This results in an unjust meritocracy, creating opposition to income inequality. To reflect these beliefs, anti-inequality (as opposed to anti-poverty) social policies should emphasize: undeserving rich, deserving workers; opportunity-

expanding policies and redistribution in the private sector (e.g., education, jobs/growth, fair pay); in addition to traditional government redistributive policies such as welfare and progressive taxes, as indicated by traditional welfare state models of redistribution.

## **Discussion:**

### *On factors influencing respondents*

Nonna Mayer: Who supports the different opinions presented here? Does being democrat or republican change the answers? Is it the same if you are an African-American or a Hispanic ? Gender? Religion?

Leslie Mc Call: There is just a minor effect of democrats and republicans. It's a cross-party issue. There is no effect of religion either. Those from lower income categories appear more concerned about income inequality. The most educated are the more concerned about inequality, but those on the highest income are more unconcerned about inequality.

### *On the importance of race*

Jessica Welburn: Race is a significant component in the US. How does the whole population see race? Why do the Blacks fare worse economically than Whites? Americans show overall sympathy towards inequalities, but what about specifically towards inequalities and this race or this gender?

Leslie Mc Call: What was interesting is that very few people are willing to admit that race matters. Few people will say that race, or coming from a wealthy family, are important. Those who do say that a coming from a wealthy family matters are more likely to be concerned about income inequalities.

### *On the links with immigration*

Marcelo de Almeida Medeiros: Is there any correlation between beliefs about income inequality and immigration?

Leslie Mc Call: There's a lot more that needs to be done on immigration. Those who are more concerned about income inequality tend to be more anti-immigrant. Concerns about income inequality are linked to equal opportunity. The link here is that those people are worried about jobs. Part of the concerns about immigrants stealing jobs is a concern about restricted opportunities. What they would like to see is increased jobs and fair pay.

### *On the influence of the health care reform debate*

Laurence Tubiana: In 2008, the health care reform debate is taking place. Would you think the way the debate was framed is an element of people being more concerned about inequalities?

Leslie McCall: People are concerned about the opportunities for getting jobs, but not opportunities for child education. One of the big issues is how the issue of income inequalities is related by politicians to policy. It can be connected to health, but is it? In the American context, the most connected issues to inequalities are education, pay and immigration, not health.

### *On the cohort effect*

Frédéric Gonthier: Did you also test the cohort effect, by including different generations (babyboomers, generation X, generation Y)?

Leslie Mc Call: In 2008, there is a little bit of a cohort effect. But before 2008, there is no cohort effect.

### *On competing media issues*

Alain Chenu: What about the Gulf War? Wars are usually good for integration. Is there an impact of the two Gulf wars and of 9/11 on the way people feel as members of a same community?

Leslie McCall: When looking at the media analysis, one of the things that made the mid-1990s unusual relative to the 2000s, is that in the 2000s you have competing major issues. War being one

of them. The welfare reforms were taken off the table politically. This is probably going to effect the 2010 data as well.

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Session 3: Reactions to Inequalities in the South: Case Studies (Friday May 27, 2011)

## **Laurence Louër**

### **The Reciprocal Politicization of Socioeconomic and Religious Inequalities in Bahrain**

Bahrain is an archipelago of the Persian Gulf. It's the smallest of the Gulf countries. It belongs to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The "pearl plaza" is where the demonstrators gather. 80% of the state budget comes from oil revenues. It has 1.2m inhabitants, 51% of which are expatriates. They mainly come from India and are called "guest workers". Among the national population, the most salient divide is between Shias and Sunnis. According to estimates, the ratio is that 70% of the population is Shia. 30% of the population is Sunni. Bahrain is a constitutional monarchy, on the paper. It is ruled by a dynasty who belongs to the Sunni minority. There's an elected Parliament that was reinstated in 2002. The Parliament has very few powers. Elections are made such as the opposition cannot have a majority. Bahrain is in fact a "liberalized autocracy". The main opposition movement today is a Shia islamist movement, *Al Wifaq* (the "Concord").

There is a very generous welfare state in Bahrain. This welfare state is based on two feet: 1. Social policies such as free education, health care, a retirement scheme, etc. 2. A specific labour market regulation policy. It plays an important role in the "employment divide" in the country.

#### *Social divides in Bahrain*

When we speak about inequalities, a first divide, the sharpest in the society is the divide between nationals and expatriates. This is also true of the other GCC countries. There is a massive presence of expatriates. It goes back to the inception of the oil industry. Foreigners came because the locals did not have the skills to the oil industry. So companies recruited abroad. Guest workers increased during the 1970s, in the era of the "oil boom". A very specific framework deals with foreign workers, the "sponsorship system". An expatriate cannot come without being invited by a national who is responsible for his behaviour on the country. Expatriates cannot change employment without asking the permission of their employer. They have no room in manoeuvre in negotiating their working conditions.

The second divide is internal to the national population, between Sunni and Shia. These identities cannot really be chosen. Few people convert to one or the other religion. The sharpness of this divide lies in the fact that it is correlated to other divides. The Shia overall feel as conquered people. In the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the Sunni ruling dynasty conquered militarily the island. At the time, the majority of the population was Shia. So the Shia tend to see themselves as the native population against the Sunni who are alien. This is a recent narrative. In the 1960s and 1970s, there have been changes in the region. For instance, the mobilization of the Iraqi Shia clerical establishment and the Iranian revolution. This has contributed to politicize the Sunni/Shia divide. Political parties used to transcend religious divides, but there is an increasing correspondence between political positioning and religion.

#### *Politicization of unemployment*

The labour market policy dates back to oil boom period. The government used the oil wealth to establish a strict segmentation, separating nationals and expatriates. This in order to avoid competition between the two groups. In the 1930s, the government decided that each head of family would be granted a job in the public sector, and that expatriates would work in the private sector. But there was a crisis of this labour market regulation in the 1990s. Not all the national population

was absorbed in the labour market any more. Private enterprises were dominated by expatriates employed under cheap conditions. Nationals could not accept the low wages offered.

The Shia Islamic movement tried to politicize unemployment by putting the issue into the general Sunni/Shia framework. Shia would not find work because the government discriminates them. There would be a policy to favour the recruitment of Sunni in the public sector. Public employment today is what Bahraini want to have. Today you can wait up to 15 years to have a public job. Public jobs are better paid, are tied to a variety of social benefits.

But later on, there were economic reforms to solve the unemployment problem. The government did so by reforming the labour market. The aim was to raise the cost of expatriate work. The idea is to equalize the cost of expatriate and national labour, in order to reach a fair competition between both groups. So they created a tax on companies for each expatriate labour, the revenue of which goes to a fund for educating Bahraini and improve their skills. There was also a campaign to improve working conditions in the private sector and to extend welfare benefits in the private sector. Thus, unemployment was not perceived as a political problem but as a technical problem. The Islamic Shia movement agreed to the governmental reforms.

*Why is unemployment not seen as a non-political issue?*

General economic reforms in Bahrain aim at preserving the welfare state. The idea is to contain revolutionary tendencies. Opposition activists want the maintenance of the welfare state and the extension of its benefits in the private sector. A second hypothesis is that opposition activists have affinities with the private sector. In the Middle East, when you are an opposition activist, you cannot have access to the public sector. Many of them also went into exile, where they worked in the private sector, studied often technical discipline.

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### **Marcelo de Almeida Medeiros**

#### **Why are strong inequalities accepted in Brazil?**

Les problèmes peuvent être vus de plusieurs façons, sous l'angle des politiques publiques, de la globalisation et de la porosité des frontières. On peut penser les causes des inégalités dans toute leur complexité. Jusqu'ici on voyait les inégalités de façon interne, mais du fait de la porosité des frontières, l'extérieur compte aussi. Aujourd'hui, on ne peut imaginer l'Etat confiné à son territoire. On peut utiliser l'outil analytique de Putnam pour voir le rôle de l'Etat dans le combat sur les inégalités. Putnam parle d'un jeu à 2 niveaux. Politique étrangère d'un Etat soumise à un niveau de négociation externe et interne. Le niveau interne conditionne les propositions mises en place au niveau externe. Si on inverse la procédure, on peut appliquer la formule dans l'autre sens. On peut imaginer que le niveau externe conditionne le niveau interne. Il y a une possibilité que l'arène internationale d'une façon ou d'une autre oblige les Etats à avoir un certain type de politiques publiques.

Si on revient sur la question de politiques publiques, on serait tenté de placer le Brésil dans une catégorie "libérale dégénérée" dans la typologie des Etats-Providence. Il existe une prédominance des intérêts privés par rapport à l'intérêt public. Si on revient sur la globalisation et la porosité des frontières, l'Etat nation n'est plus capable d'exercer de façon adéquate ses compétences, surtout économiques. Ceci touche au combat contre les inégalités. Le processus de régionalisation crée un nouveau modus operandi pour l'Etat nation. Le Mercosur aujourd'hui occupe une place secondaire dans la formation des politiques publiques. Le Brésil doit aussi faire face aux inégalités de ses partenaires. Il existe une sorte de crise de l'Etat dans le monde, et le Brésil en souffre. L'Etat brésilien se sert du processus d'intégration régionale, car pendant de longues années le Brésil était fermé sur lui-même. La mise en place du Mercosur sert à intégrer le Brésil sur la scène internationale. Mais à partir du moment où le Brésil a été davantage intégré, le Brésil a commencé à

vouloir procéder à une intégration, non plus par le biais du Mercosur mais individuellement. Le Mercosur devient une sorte de fardeau car le Brésil doit financer certains processus d'intégration. On peut identifier des phénomènes qui peuvent donner des réponses à la question: pourquoi les fortes inégalités sont-elles acceptées au Brésil.

### *Les facteurs endogènes*

Il existe un quasi-consensus au Brésil sur les structures socio-politiques du pays. Être un pays riche ne veut pas dire que les inégalités vont être réduites automatiquement. Dans le cas Brésilien il y a des problèmes structurels. Historiquement, il y a un héritage colonial avec une libération tardive des esclaves. La fragmentation territoriale conduit à une vision isolationniste pour le combat des inégalités. Les cycles économiques brésiliens se sont mis au diapason de l'économie internationale (or, café, canne à sucre, caoutchouc). Les conséquences sociales de ces cycles n'ont pas été combattues de façon correcte par les pouvoirs publics. Les flux migratoires internes sont une conséquence de ces changements de cycles économiques. Les politiques publiques n'atténuent pas l'impact social des changements de cycles.

Si l'on revisite les auteurs classiques brésiliens, on voit qu'il n'existe pas d'espace public au Brésil. Tous les espaces comprenant des rapports sociaux sont privatisés. Cette "cordialité" est néfaste à l'autonomisation de l'espace public. L'espace public est induement approprié par des intérêts privés.

### *Les facteurs exogènes*

On ne peut pas s'éloigner du contexte international. Le facteur Chine frappe positivement et négativement le Brésil. Si les exportations brésiliennes ont beaucoup augmenté, c'est grâce aux exportations vers la Chine. Mais, de façon négative, cela impacte les inégalités du fait d'un retour aux exportations aux produits de faible valeur ajoutée (produits agricoles). Y a-t-il un processus de désindustrialisation au Brésil? L'économie mondiale a un impact sur les cycles économiques au Brésil, ce qui génère des inégalités entre classes et entre régions.

L'Etat Brésilien aujourd'hui est la conséquence d'une politique constante menée depuis 16 ans, qui a permis de stabiliser l'économie. Ceci a permis la mise en place de politiques publiques. Ces instruments ont été introduits par les gouvernements de Cardoso et de Lula. Ces deux chefs d'Etats ont réussi à concilier les facteurs endogènes et exogènes. Le nombre de pauvres au Brésil a chuté.

Le Brésil aujourd'hui pratique une autonomie, centrée sur l'Etat-nation et non sur l'intégration régionale. L'insertion sur la scène mondiale s'est faite en privilégiant les formats comme les BRICS, des relations bilatérales,

Les politiques publiques des 16 dernières années ont tenté de minimiser les inégalités, mais il reste beaucoup de choses à faire. Si on concilie le niveau international et le niveau national, il faudrait diminuer les intérêts privés et les actions idéologiques. Les inégalités sont le résultat d'un habitus social et d'une politique publique.

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## **Moustapha Sène**

### **Les émeutes de la faim et la colère sociale au Sénégal**

En 2008, le Sénégal connaissait ce que la presse nationale et les médias internationaux ont appelé à l'époque « les émeutes de la faim ». Des contestations d'une rare violence sous-tendues par des appels, des messages, des déclarations ou encore des mises en garde de la population à l'endroit du régime de l'alternance. La particularité de ces événements tenait moins à la faim en soi qu'à l'accumulation de problèmes sociaux, émanant de plusieurs secteurs et différents niveaux qui résultent en dernière instance sur des politiques et des sphères de décision qui s'imposent aux populations sénégalaises. Au-delà du besoin alimentaire, il y a ici et là des disparités et des

frustrations sociales que les émeutes ont contribuées à révéler à travers un cadre d'expression explicite, l'espace public. Outre cependant les protestations multiformes observées, on peut s'interroger sur l'absence de manifestation de certains pans de la société dont les conditions de vie ne sont guère meilleures. Un constat qui conduit d'emblée à faire une mise au point sur les facteurs qui expliquent la faim et partant la colère sociale en tant que processus et système caractérisant le Sénégal d'aujourd'hui. En effet, le développement de la mondialisation néolibérale a accentué les inégalités Nord/Sud, mais elle a aussi creusé des écarts plus profonds entre pays du Sud ou populations d'un même État. Un dernier scénario qui constitue la réalité du Sénégal présentement même si l'observation et l'analyse des questions d'inégalité sociale dans ce pays ne sauraient se restreindre à la seule dimension de la globalisation économique. Le mode de gestion des affaires publiques et l'autoritarisme du régime politique en place sont plus qu'engagés dans la situation de précarité que confrontent les sénégalais pour la grande majorité. Des défaillances dans la mise en place des politiques publiques et un manque de vision dans la gouvernance ont fortement participé à bouleverser les acquis sociaux.

À la lecture de ces manifestations qui ont émaillé l'espace public sénégalais en 2008 sous l'étiquette d'« émeutes de la faim », on peut se rendre à l'évidence que cela n'était qu'une opportunité d'expression de diverses frustrations qui sont à la fois la résultante d'une crise économique mondiale à effet immédiat, d'une crise de la représentation politique liée à une gouvernance retardataire, de mutations sociales tournées vers des stratégies d'adaptation durable ainsi que de nouvelles pratiques qui renseignent sur le dynamisme et la créativité de la société. C'est d'ailleurs à ce niveau qu'on peut mieux percevoir la floraison des modes d'engagement et de militantisme des acteurs qui révèle la primauté de la dimension matérielle des investissements dans l'espace public sur les préoccupations morales. Un fait qui s'est surtout consolidé avec la crise économique découlant de la mondialisation néolibérale et du régime autoritaire en place dont l'architecture expose une perméabilité apparente qui démontre comment ce que l'on appelle « démocratie sénégalaise » est fragile. Il ne s'agit pas d'organiser des élections transparentes, ni de faire une « alternance » politique, ni de s'appuyer sur des clans acquis à sa cause, moins d'avoir des institutions ou de conduire des politiques unilatéralement pour se représenter comme telle. Pour qu'elle soit viable, la démocratie nécessite entre autres des institutions solides, autonomes et neutres, alors qui ne sont pas au service des intérêts particularistes ainsi qu'une opposition forte, institutionnalisée et reconnue. Plus fondamentale est la préservation des libertés et des droits des citoyens non pas juste sur le plan textuel mais dans la réalité de leur vécu et principalement dans leurs rapports avec l'État qui est non subordonné dans son espace interne. L'éclosion des débats d'idée et l'expression plurielle, non conventionnelle toujours, des sensibilités dans l'espace public, la participation des populations<sup>102</sup> constituent présentement des bases essentielles de la construction d'une société civile, elle-même fondamentale pour la vitalité de la démocratie. Mais dans une acception occidentale, le terme demeure discutable selon René Otayek, « en l'absence des conditions qui assurent, dans les sociétés occidentales, la régulation de la tension entre intérêts individuels et bien commun : des règles du jeu politique institutionnalisées et intériorisées par les acteurs, une culture politique démocratique et intégrative, un sens partagé de la res publica, la dissociation de l'économique et du politique, l'individuation et la sécularisation, etc. ? ». Une observation qui met en exergue la nécessité d'analyser les sociétés africaines en tenant compte un peu plus des spécificités liées à leur mode de structuration afin de saisir leurs réalités évolutives, de mieux discerner dans ce cas ci les contours de leur société civile, d'identifier ce qui pourrait être pensé comme inclusif ou ce qui ressort d'un simple constituant de l'espace public.

## **Discussion**

### *On reactions to inequalities in the South*

Elise Huillery: What we hear here were three case studies to understand reactions toward inequalities. Why are there differences in reactions? When looking at the income Gini index, Bahrain had 0.36 in 2008, Brazil had 0.55 in 2007 and Senegal 0.39 in 2005. Inequalities seem

more accepted where they are larger: Marcelo de Almeida Medeiros discussed why inequalities are rather “accepted” in Brazil – which is the most unequal country. In Senegal, there are less high inequalities, but the reaction was big in 2008. In Bahrain, inequality at a global level is pretty low, but there was a political reaction towards inequalities in the labour market. The solution to the inequality was found pretty quickly in Bahrain. So there is a paradox. A recent survey in France (by Viavoice), conducted on left-wing people, shows that the two main concerns are poverty and inequalities. But inequalities in France are quite low compared to other countries (0.32). It's as if the less unequal countries are also those who care more about inequality.

*What are the determinants of acceptance towards inequalities?* How can we explain the reverse relationship between inequalities and acceptance of inequalities? There are two determinants of acceptance: 1. the concern and 2. the ability to fight. Regarding the concern for inequality, it seems to depend on values, social habitus and history. We might also call this endogenous preferences. If you are used to inequalities then you have lower incentive to fight, because it does not seem such big a deal. A second cause of the lack of concern in highly unequal society is the fact that the poor people might have no availability to fight. The main concern is to fulfil basic needs, which leaves no time to involve in the fight against inequalities. When talking about ability, the lack of ability to fight might also come from a lack of education.

In the paper on Brazil, the lack of capacity might come from a weak educational system and poor political institutions. So the poorest don't have the means to fight. The paper on Brazil also mentioned the lack of concern due to economic instability, so poor people might not be able to pay attention to fairness. There is also social habitus coming from colonial heritage: preferences are shaped by an existing unequal social norm. In Senegal, it appears that inequalities are a more recent phenomenon. Senegal is not an unequal society, historically speaking. But the globalization gave rise to increased inequalities. This suggests that Senegalese people are very much concerned if you take their history about inequalities. Brazilian do not have this concern, due to social norms. In Senegal, there was a big social anger in March 2008, whereas there is no such mobilization in Brazil. So different historical backgrounds might explain different reactions. Moreover, the leaders of the mobilization in Senegal are also the educated people, not only those who suffer the most from hunger. There are young educated people who fight for their rights in general, expression of their willingness for a fair world more generally. This is consistent with the fact that to fight inequalities you need availability and education. In Bahrain, we have the case of high ability, capacity and high concern as well. The Bahraini context is not a context of high poverty, but one of a generous welfare state. Maybe there was no tradition of inequality in the past?

*What implications can we draw from the paradox?* The first implication would be the persistence of inequalities, but also the divergence of inequalities? If people are ready to accept a situation, then they don't ask for policies to change it, and inequalities remain. So this would be a vicious circle. In the long term impact of colonization in West Africa, we see that the people who fought the most against the colonial powers were the most educated, who benefited the most from public policies implemented by the French administration. So here is the same paradox, which is that there is a reversal of fortune for those who become more educated, they suffer less against inequalities but they fight more against inequalities. People who live in a high context of inequalities have a higher acceptance of inequality.

*What can be done about it?* A voluntary intervention from the state or civil society is seen in Brazil. People have a higher acceptance, so naturally they demand less reduction of inequalities. But the Brazilian experience of a voluntary public policy to decrease inequalities is the first step in a virtuous circle, as a first decrease of inequalities may lead to stronger demands for the reduction of inequalities.

Laurence Louër: Where you have a strong welfare state to start with, then when the welfare state retrenches, this fosters protests (as in Bahrain). A 2<sup>nd</sup> point would be that at the end of the day, politics do matter. When you can organize politically then you can weigh on decision-makers. Political competence in general matters. But it's more complex to evaluate how people can gain this competence: the education, the ability to organize collectively. In Bahrain, people are highly

educated, there is no unalphabetisation among the national population. There is a strong quality of social institutions in Bahrain where social policies, the health care system, housing system works, the retirement scheme is not in a crisis. This is what contributed between the 1970s and 1990s to maintain social peace despite the Sunni/Shia divide. In Bahrain, there has been a long tradition of mobilizing politically since the 1930s. When the labour market policy was implemented in the 1970s it thanks to the activism of trade unions and leftist groups.

Marcelo de Almeida Medeiros: There is a Portuguese expression that means more or less that we always find a way to resolve a problem. When you have an institutional barrier in front of you, you always find a way to counter it. This kind of behaviour goes against the notion of mobilization. General problems are not a concern for individuals. In Brazil, everyone wants to be a free rider. You wait for others to lead the mobilization. In Mercosur, there is a structural fund. Brazil represents a large part of this structural fund. On the other hand, due to redistribution, other countries benefit from these funds (Paraguay, Uruguay). So this shows how far can globalization have an impact on public policies in certain countries: Congressmen do not agree with giving money away to neighbouring countries, instead of fighting inequalities in Brazil. But globalization is not an option. Brazil has adapted to this reality and could decrease inequalities during the last 16 years.

Nonna Mayer: In France, if we look at some surveys, you see that there is a high percentage of people thinking that France is an unfair society: 78% in 2010. 84% think that inequalities will keep rising in France. When you start giving in, when you start tackling the problems, then you raise the levels of expectation and that's when everything can explode.

Frederic Gonthier: What seems to be important for tolerance towards inequalities is not only the degree of assistance provided by the state, but the fact that assistance goes to some categories of people. These categories structure the way people see inequalities. If you ask the French what's the minimum wage under which you can't leave, they answer the actual minimum wage provided by the state. But they are unable to give a maximum wage. So answers are framed by state policies. Poor people not only lack capacity and concern, but also skills of perception. The history of the welfare state shape the perceptions.

Alice Wuermli: In Argentina, there are also high inequalities. Mobilization is actually organized by the state. People go to the streets, but it's organized by the dominant political party. When you talk about public space and urban spaces: the role of political institutions can fill these spaces when civil society does not have a lot of room to act on its own.

Moustapha Sène: Les initiateurs des mouvements, en général il est vrai sont des gens qui ont fait des études, qui ont des compétences. Parfois ils viennent des classes sociales très aisées. Il existe beaucoup de résignation, de gens qui ne vont pas lutter parce qu'ils n'en ont pas les ressources. En faisant face à un régime répressif dans les manifestations, on peut être emprisonné, battu ou même tué. Et ceux qui le peuvent n'hésitent pas à s'expatrier. Les inégalités grandissantes provenant des crises économiques sont assez récentes au Sénégal. Les manifestations se sont multipliées car les inégalités se voient de plus en plus. Les gens qui ont accès aux ressources montrent leur richesse de façon plus ostentatoire, ce qui influe sur l'imaginaire des plus modestes et suscite aussi des réactions. Au Sénégal, la société civile sera un moyen dans le futur de combattre ces inégalités. Dans ce pays, il n'y a pas d'aides sociales, si vous êtes pauvres vous vous débrouillez (secteur informel). On ne se définit donc pas à partir de ce qu'on reçoit de l'Etat. Une autre particularité est la présence de fortes solidarités familiales. La personne qui réussit aide les autres. S'agissant des talibés, la majeure partie des enfants dans la rue sont pour la plupart venus de la sous-région, du fait de la porosité des frontières avec CEDEAO. Ceux qui fuient les combats ailleurs viennent au Sénégal et occupent souvent l'espace de la rue. Près de 70% des enfants dans la rue viennent de la sous-région. Ce n'est pas la société sénégalaise en général qui laisse ces enfants dans la rue: la structure sociétale et l'histoire du pays empêche ce type d'inégalités.

#### *On the Bahraini situation*

Nonna Mayer: How was the fieldwork done in Bahrain? How do you articulate the cleavage between expatriates/nationals and Sunni/Shia ?

Laurence Louër: Field work was qualitative. The question on the articulation between the religious and the social divide is difficult to answer at this stage. The national/expatriates divide is the strongest. Shia and Sunni are united in despising the expatriates. There are some intermarriages between Shia and Sunni, but this is impossible between nationals and expatriates. With labour market reform from 2006 onwards, the way Shia and Sunni unionists look at expatriates has changed. Today, unionists have come to understand that they need to mobilize workers. The aim is to raise the cost of expatriate labour. In the last years, the majority of trade union members were expatriates. They do not have the right to create trade unions but they can be members of trade unions created by nationals. Categories created by the state do matter: it is true that in the Gulf countries, with generous welfare states now in crisis, people think they own the benefits of the welfare state, it's legitimate. If the benefits decrease then the legitimacy of the state decreases. That's why governments want to maintain the welfare state.

#### *On the Brazilian situation*

Nonna Mayer: What did you mean by the “cordial man” in Brazil? There is no public space in Brazil?

Marcelo Medeiros: “Cordial man” means that it is possible to identify in the whole Brazilian history the predominance of private interests who find their own space in closed spaces which leave little access for impersonal relations. Relations are seen on an emotional mode and without any rituals. This statement shows that it's very difficult in Brazil to leave the personal relationship. Even if we are in an institutional space, in a public space, this kind of relationship tends to be present. Even if we have strong institutions, there are parallel practices that transform public policies into clientist mechanisms. This perpetuates this type of behaviour that we can identify in Brazil. The other thing to discuss in Brazil is racism. It is another way to think about inequalities. Part of Brazilians support affirmative action policies. But how do you differentiate Black people? Take the famous example of twins, one of them was black, the other was white: why treat them differently?

Elisa Reis: Why cultural persistence would be taken as normal, and why would change be the thing to be exchanged? We can also try to think about why culture persists. In Brazil, the rich people have more means to bypass obstacles. On the acceptance of inequalities in Brazil: for about 40 years, there was no change in the Brazil gini coefficient. Despite inequalities, the chance of social mobility has always been very high in Brazil. From the very low to slightly better. It is possible to improve your conditions.

#### *On the Senegalese situation*

Nonna Mayer: Are there ethnic cleavages in the Senegalese society?

Moustapha Sene: Au Sénégal, 95% de gens sont musulmans. Les relations entre ethnies ne sont pas problématiques. Le problème se situe plus au niveau de la lignée familiale. Si quelqu'un accède à un poste de responsabilité, il favorisera les membres de sa famille. Les inégalités ne sont pas liées aux ethnies.

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Session 4: The subjective Experience and Reactions to Poverty and Inequality (Saturday May 28, 2011)

### **Jennifer Silva**

#### **American Working Class Selfhood in an Age of Economic Uncertainty: and Neoliberal Ideology (the Contrasted Effects of Race, Class and Gender)”**

In the post world war economic golden age, transition to adulthood was easy. Today, traditional markers of adulthood have become increasingly delayed and sometimes foregone, in advanced industrialized nations worldwide.

In the US, working class young men have experienced a decline in available jobs and subsidized health insurance. Adulthood has been increasingly de-institutionalized particularly for the post-industrial working class. There has also been a destabilization of the gender roles and family structures: since the 1970s, rates of marriage have declined and rates of divorce have increased.

What kind of narratives do working-class men and women use to validate their self growth? People grasp their lives in story-telling. It's through narrative that one builds its social identity and give meaning to one's life. People story their lives in recognizable ways, through what's available in their cultural environment. What the individual becomes depends on the reconstructive endeavours she or he engages in.

The therapeutic language is more accessible to the US middle-class rather than the US working-class. Therapeutic emotional and linguistic skills are absent in the working-class life. Blue collar mobilizes an ethos of bravery. But the post industrial working-class cannot be seen homogeneously. They experience a struggle to come to term with the disappearance of blue collar work that used to mark the passage to adulthood.

A vast majority of respondents can no longer rely on traditional markers. Three kinds of narratives can be identified, that make sense of the disappearance or delay of traditional markers of transition to adulthood: traditional (17 respondents out of 100), religious (7%), therapeutic (76%).

We may notice the predominance of the family past. Over the 3/4<sup>th</sup> of respondents told their coming of age stories as a struggle to triumph over the demons of their pasts. Those “demons” take 3 key forms: pain or betrayal in past relationships, emotional, mental or cognitive disorders, addiction to drugs, alcohol or pornography. For post industrial working class young people, the past-centred therapeutic narrative allows to make failure meaningful, especially for those who don't find hope in their jobs or future.

The therapeutic narrative transforms the self into one's greater obstacle against happiness. The therapeutic ethos makes powerless working-class young people responsible for their own unhappiness. The self is endowed with the power to make or unmake itself. 70% of the respondents considered themselves as their greatest risk. It is a neo-liberal ideal of individual responsibility. In the absence of traditional markers, the majority of young men and women depend on constructing their self to mark their transition of adulthood.

Witness is the key to progress, to transforming suffering into self-realization and triumphantly crossing the threshold of adulthood.

The therapeutic narrative allows competent adulthood to be defined not in terms of traditional markers like financial independence a career or a marriage, but rather in terms of psychic development.

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## **Graziella Moraes Da Silva and Elisa Reis**

### **From discrimination to destigmatization: A new approach to understand the Brazilian Racial Puzzle**

The Brazilian racial puzzle is not as happy as is often said.

Racial inequalities have been recognized but there have been very few episodes of racial tensions.

There is a low perception of difference between blacks and whites and lots of interracial marriage.

One key aspect is the role of racial discrimination in Brazil. A lot of studies claim that discrimination is the key variable of persistent inequalities. But some people say this is not true, that there are lots of missing variables can explain this. The question is then: is there strong discrimination or not? And does it explain racial inequalities?

So we move the question to “destigmatization”. Destigmatization means the rhetorical and strategic tools deployed by individual members of stigmatized groups in reaction to perceived stigmatization, racism, and discrimination. It's a qualitative understanding.

Discrimination is a pretty straightforward concept. It means that your race doesn't allow you to get

access to resources or institutions. But as a variable to measure, it is controversial. There are two ways to measure it, one statistically, and the other one through perceptions. Both ways to measure it have problems. Statistically, you measure everything's that is not discrimination, and qualitatively, you rely on what people are saying which you can overestimate or underestimate. In Brazil, if you measure discrimination statistically, you would see that it is very strong. But according to perceptions, the result is much lower. This can lead to two interpretations: 1. a false consciousness of discrimination (black Brazilians are not aware that they are discriminated); 2. inequality is mostly about class, poverty in Brazil, not about racial discrimination. 90% of Brazilians, black and white, acknowledge that there is racial prejudice. But only 22% of blacks and browns say they have already been discriminated.

In the approach used here, interviewees were not told that the interview was about race. Were told it was about social mobility. Strategies to fight racism were asked in the course of the interview. Four types of strategies to fight racism were identified: individual versus collective and pragmatic versus idealistic. Here are some of these strategies:

- The achievement strategy: To educate oneself, work harder, reject victimization, not use discrimination as an excuse. This is recurrent among middle and working-classes.
- Ignore: To decide not to react. This is also frequent across classes, but with different justifications. For professionals, when you are not sure you're discriminated, you do not want to waste your energy. For the working class, you do not worry about this, to not create conflict, uneasiness.
- Confront: This is a middle-class type of strategy. React in front of the act, speak out, insult, fight racism.
- Act Against Stereotype strategy: To display a counter-image (if you think black are poor or uneducated I will act to challenge the stereotype). For instance, buy more to show that even if you're black you can consume. This is a very common type of narrative. It is partly pragmatic and partly idealistic, because you want to change group image). This is recurring across middle and working-class.
- Forgiveness strategy: To feel superior. It is more frequent among working class, sometimes along a religious discourse.
- Racial consciousness: More and more people develop an identity as "Negro" (black identity), seen as positive. This is between individual and collective identity. You may feel Blackness without ethnicity, it may be a very individualized strategy. You don't necessarily join a black movement.
- Racial mixture: This is one of the most common strategies mentioned. It is a positive evaluation of mixed identities and an ability to cross racial boundaries. There exists an ideal that Brazilians are equal because everybody is mixed. But racial mixture is different from racial democracy. It is not that there is no discrimination, but you can fight discrimination if you do not see the boundaries as rigid.
- Affirmative action: This policy was set in 2003. It is understood as racial quotas, to access to university. It's collective and pragmatic. Although a lot of people claim it's good in the short term, people still prefer universal policies.

### *Conclusions*

There is a tension between individual / pragmatic and collective / idealistic strategies. Most strategies are individual and pragmatic (but this maybe due to methods of survey).

The choice of pragmatic and confrontational destigmatization strategies are not perceived in contradiction to racial mixing. It allows racial inequalities to be perceived but symbolic boundaries remain blurred. You see discrimination but you believe in the long term in racial mixing. There is evidence of the strength of national repertoires in shaping racial ideals. The fact that there's more social mobility and affirmative action might change the narratives.

### **Discussion:**

*On Jennifer Silva's paper*

Daniel Sabbagh: Do we know that non-working class people rely on the same kind of narrative as working-class people?

Jessica Welburn: A couple of your respondents have a history of substance abuse. Detoxing experiences are very strong, what can be the effect? What about race difference?

Question to Jennifer Silva: What do you call therapeutic narrative? You are speaking first about a narrative that displayed itself in the middle-class related to the diffusion of psychology and the terms of “healing process”. In the rest of your presentation, you say you see elements of the therapeutic narrative in your interview. But when you present your interviewees, it sounds more like a “redemption” narrative, with Christian works. This challenges the core argument, are not respondents simply deploying a redemption narrative, which can be easily explained in the US society? Are these people religious?

Joshua Guetzkow: You assert these are new phenomenon due to the post-industrial economy. We don't really know if they are new. Do respondents have trajectories that live up to their expectations? Have you seen anything about the experience of incarceration?

Jennifer Silva: There is indeed no middle-class comparison. But it well established in the literature that middle-class do use the therapeutic narrative. Scholars show that middle-class people use therapeutic narrative in a way that enhances their well-being. Is the working-class able to use this same narrative effectively? They cannot: they may be able to use the language but they cannot make it work. In terms of mental health or alcoholism experiences, there is interest in seeing when they go into healing institutions because in there they learn the therapeutic language. In terms of marriage: race and gender differences: White men would become very nostalgic, romantic, when speaking of marriage. For Black men, it appears that they see monogamy impossible. For White women there is more an idea of independence while Black women on the other hand show more will make sacrifices. On the redemption language, most respondents do not see themselves as religious. In any case the therapeutic narrative is stronger as it overlaps with other US narratives.

Leslie McCall: Could the characteristics that you found in your sample be verified with survey statistics. There are lots of mental health surveys in which you can look at the youth group. You could try to to what extent your sample matches the public health related data.

#### *On Graziella Moraes da Silva and Elisa Reis's paper*

Daniel Sabbagh: One question and two comments. The question: Are examination outcomes in Brazil correlated with race or colour? The comments: 1. Why choose what might look like an all-encompassing definition of racism? Whether one defines racism as an attitude or, more restrictively, as an ideology, racism is but one of the explanatory factors for racial inequalities. So why conflate racism and racial inequality? 2. The paper begins by emphasizing that you will use perceptions of discrimination as a proxy for discrimination itself. But then you argue that some interviewees are unaware or in denial of discrimination. Is there not a contradiction there? Besides, in the U.S., in the early 1990s a survey showed that nearly 30 of Black respondents in New York believed that it was either “true” or “plausible” that the HIV had been fabricated purposefully to kill African Americans... In this light, wouldn't one be better off avoiding the assumption that perceptions of discrimination stand as an acceptable proxy for discrimination itself?

Jessica Welburn: Although there is a perception gap, many perceptions are rooted in what actually happens.

Graziella Moraes da Silva: Racism is the broader term. Racism is part of history. Brazil was a racist country because it relied on race for nation building. How race is used today to close people from certain resources and institutions means racial discrimination. How do we go from discrimination to destigmatization: everybody accepts that there is prejudice in Brazil and even racism, but not all actually see discrimination.

Crystal Fleming: I come back on the idea that perceptions of blurred boundaries allow people to feel less racial inequalities. What kinds of events or interactions would disrupt this feeling? What if the state was to engage into state sponsored racial violence?

Graziella Moraes da Silva: This is related to the fact that racism and being racist is a huge offence in

Brazil. The biggest fear people have about affirmative action is the possibility that it might increase racism in Brazil.

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### **Nissim Mizrachi, Hanna Herzog, Joshua Guetkow**

#### **Positioned Identity and Exclusion: Destigmatization Strategies Among Palestinian-Arab Citizens in Israel, Ethiopian Jews and Mizrahi Jews**

Here, we will try to look at how ordinary people make sense of the sociological discourse itself. Most of the literature deals with historical trends and structural factors. In addition, studies have focused primarily on the elite's attitudes to equality, with little attention paid to how ordinary people make sense of their positions. More precisely, we are interested here in the way that minority groups understand and react to situations of stigmatization. However, by focusing on people's lived experience we do lose sight of the broader frameworks within which they operate. The historical and national context remains essential because the particular history of the location plays a major role in shaping social and symbolic boundaries.

The Zionist movement emerged in 19th century in Europe. Its main goal was to inspire Jews to return to the homeland and create a new, modern, secular Jewish state. It was a collective project involving identity formation. I want to emphasize that the identity project was a modernist project, aimed at the creation of a European, Western, rational and secular Jew. Against this background, we can understand some of the logic of stigmatization that has developed within contemporary Israeli society, a logic fuelled by orientalism rather than biological biases. In addition, we need to keep in mind the major political conflict and deep-seated animosity between Arabs and Jews.

When Israel gained independence in 1948, there were about 800,000 inhabitants, mostly European, known as Ashkenazi Jews. From 1949 to 1951, 700,000 Sephardic and Mizrahi Jews, coming from Arab countries, immigrated to the new state. This created a crisis of national identity due to the highly diverse cultural character of these populations.

The native-born Arab population within Israel is often referred to as Palestinian citizens of Israel. They represent 19% of the population. Their socio-economic status is generally low. There is almost total residential segregation and, with the exclusion of Tel Aviv-Jaffa and Haifa, only small numbers live in Israel's major cities. At the same time, the Arab population maintains a separate school system within the national system. Ethiopians represent 1.8% of Israel's population. They also belong to the lowest socio-economic ranks. Almost total residential segregation exists here, too. The Mizrahim represent 26.5% of current population and have mixed socio-economic status. Integration is determined by class, with many living under conditions of partial residential segregation.

Social and symbolic boundaries in the context of the Jewish State are quite fixed, with Jewishness being perhaps the major factor shaping exclusion/inclusion. Social boundaries between Jews and Arabs are impermeable. Mixed marriage, for example, is almost inconceivable between these two groups. Ethiopians also live within fairly rigid social boundaries. Although Ethiopians are Jews, they are not fully accepted as such by the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox authorities. There is some mixed marriage as such relations not tabooed; they remain within normative boundaries. Mizrahim experience permeable boundaries, again based on class. Mixed marriage is fairly common, primarily within the upper-classes. Physical markers also play a significant role in social encounters, but are less obvious with Arabs than with Ethiopians. Ethiopians are the most phenotypically recognized group, and Arabs can be readily recognized by accent and habitus. Mizrahim can also be recognized on the basis of habitus, class and names. As to self-identification (meaning the sense people have of belonging to a specific group), Ethiopians tend to downplay their blackness and see themselves as Jews whereas Mizrahim do not see themselves as a distinctive, stigmatized group. Palestinian citizens of Israel tend to identify themselves with an external collective identity.

When facing discriminatory situations, people belonging to these three groups activate stigmatization strategies. The Arabs interviewed tended to depoliticize the experience of stigmatization. They were most interested in maintaining the regular order of daily life while maintaining their self-worth and dignity. They almost exclusively use local participatory and social networks. Yet, Arabs do use the language of racism. This language does not put their sense of belonging at risk due to their different collective identity. Ethiopians, in contrast, are averse to using racist terms in the context of discrimination. They practice avoidance and focus on their membership in the Jewish collectivity. They use the word discrimination mainly when describing their immigration experience and chose to remain within the grand national narrative of Diaspora Jews returning to their homeland. Ethiopians, like Mizrahim, use the third person when describing moments of discrimination: the incident happened to "someone" belonging to their group. Mizrahim use what I have called contingent detachment: They distinguish themselves from group stereotypes in selected contexts. These examples are only some of the strategies we identified and described in the papers presented.

What do we learn from such bottom-up research? It is difficult to find research studying such a range of the factors shaping social and symbolic boundaries within the same national context. We are looking at the ways that ordinary people make sense of their daily experience of stigmatization within the context of a powerful national ideology, modernity, sustained orientalism and a broad racial identification system. It's striking however, that within this context, in which both the stigmatized and the stigmatizers find themselves embedded in the same local social networks, people do invest a fair amount of social energy to maintain their sense of self-worth and dignity in addition to their participation in social spheres, irrespective of how broad or limited they may be. We can also identify how the stigmatized and the stigmatizers experience moments of social risk. For the stigmatized, much work is devoted to deciphering and interpreting their stigmatizing experiences, whether or not racism motivated their involvement. This moment can be risky and ambiguous. Hence, the participants are always involved in sense-making regarding the situation.

But even in obvious situations of discrimination, the stigmatized still collect "data" regarding their status. In one cited example, Ethiopians informants not allowed to enter a club at the moment of selection, a highly visible act of discrimination, described their lengthy interpretation of the event in alternative modes. The refusal to permit was perhaps due to not being dressed properly or because a private party was in progress. Racism may have been the last thing that came to mind.

The stigmatizer is also at risk in situations of discrimination. He or she must be cautious about being marked as sexist, racist or homophobic, behaviour that negatively valued and thus harmful to their own position. They therefore try to avoid such categorization.

In many cases, ordinary people appear to use the following very useful strategy: reversal of the experience so as to prove that they are morally superior to the stigmatizer, accomplished by teaching the stigmatizer a lesson in ethical behaviour on the basis of common attributes. This strategy provides resources for action and guides the creation of responses. The stigmatizing behaviour thus motivates them to correct the situation and the stereotype.

All groups tend to use participatory strategies. However, use of the language of racism is contingent on identity and context. When people do use it, it becomes a very strong marker of inclusion or exclusion. Saying that someone is racist is a strong statement that declares "war" against the stigmatizers. For Ethiopians, their bounded Jewish identity becomes a powerful socio-cultural resource because they can generalize their own experience to those of other Jewish Diasporas.

The only people who use identity politics among Mizrahim and Ethiopians are persons who belong to elite, highly educated and transnational social networks. These individuals can effectively mobilize global cultural capital within the local context. But to do so, they first need to be part of a network based on global cultural capital. This network is composed of people who can value diverse cultural capital on the basis of universalistic values. Persons interested in using this global network should also be in a position to turn these resources into components of identity. This observation invites us to think about how class divisions make transnational languages and global cultural resources unavailable to ordinary people. The same observation may invite us, sociologists

studying destigmatization strategies, to look at our own presumptions about the nature of equality, identity and stigmatization and reconsider our own sociological tool kit.

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## **Michèle Lamont**

### **Responses to Discrimination and Social Resiliences under Neoliberalism (US)**

This presentation is an intermediary paper, on cultural repertoires: how do respondents draw on cultural repertoires to respond to racism. Cultural Repertoires (CR) can act as buffers for individuals.

There are three patterns of responses in Brazil, Israel, and in the US. In Israel, all respondents have participatory responses. In Brazil, people talk about racial mixing. In the US, confrontation is the dominant response. We can acknowledge that the US history is racist. Racial identity is extremely salient and unambiguous. The identity that respondents mobilize in reading their environment as being racist or not varies a lot. This comes from the notion of shared national identity. Civil rights movement as confrontation are part of the US history. So a first source of repertoire is the historical context. Two other sources of cultural repertoires are neoliberalism and collective identity of Blacks as social resilient. Responses to racism are fed by cultural tools unevenly available.

The case of neoliberalism is interesting. Neoliberalism means privatization of risk, market fundamentalism, and consumption: all those tools of destigmatization become even more salient. People become competitive. It is actually a tool of liberation for Blacks: through the neoliberal type of competition, you can show that you can beat others. This is at odd with the collective response. Neoliberalism gives a single matrix of worth that says: when you're poor you're a loser.

What tools does society makes available to groups? What are the transformations in the collective identity of Blacks that makes them able to resist better the experience of stigmatization? It is an everyday challenge to belong to a stigmatized group. In the US, we notice the centrality of confronting as a response. Cultural repertoires can explain this reaction to stigmatization.

The features of neoliberalism emphasize self-reliance and autonomy, the privatization of risk, competitiveness, educational achievement. These individual responses may threaten collective responses. Lots of respondents want to launch their own business which corresponds to the values of hard work and financial independence. They put also a great emphasis on self-reliance, due to stereotype of the lazy African American. The middle-class respondents as well focus on personal achievement. The limits of racial solidarity come to competence (when you hire other Black people for instance). The 2<sup>nd</sup> most cited response as the best way to confront racism is access to education. Respondents put an emphasis on educational and economic achievement but also emphasize the importance of consumption as a means to get cultural citizenship. Expensive clothes means that one belongs to middle-class and lessens the notion of being Black. Valuing access to economic goods and cultural citizenship however excludes low-income Blacks.

Collective identity is a buffer against stigmatization. When asked what makes Blacks and Whites distinct groups, a large number of respondents explained that African-American have a shared culture, which they greatly value. They feel there is a cultural intimacy, a shared morality, a richness of Black culture and black aesthetics. No item received a higher number of responses. Respondents refer to the stories their parents have had with racism. It constitutes a script that is widely available that acts as buffer against stigmatization. It provides a tool to make sense about their own experience and avoid internalizing it. African-American are described as caring and accepting, as more in contact with the "human thing" than White people. Whites are frequently seen as having an illusion of superiority. Blacks see themselves more moral, which counterbalances the emphasis on personal achievement sustained by neoliberalism. This sustains an autonomous social space where Blacks can maintain their self pride, even against stigmatization. The declared need to give Black

children sense of purpose and pride is an alternative to the script of individual achievement made salient by neoliberalism.

### *Conclusion*

We do not know how prevalent the script of neoliberalism is in the US compared to Brazil and Israel. The African-American interviewed are less buffered from the negative effects that come with neoliberalism than the Brazilian and Israeli. The resources for empowerment can only be found among themselves. When there is no way to find explanations elsewhere, then you blame yourself. In the US, the market-fundamentalism losers are Blacks. While the US dream empowers many, it leaves those who cannot achieve it without hope. It is the tragedy of the American social fabric.

### **Discussion:**

*On Nissim Mizrahi and Hanna Herzog's paper:*

Daniel Sabbagh: Judging from some of the quotations that you provide, many of your interviewees seem to believe that, over time, contacts with the dominant group will foster the diminution of discrimination. Perhaps this finding should be connected to the literature on intergroup contact. Most of these studies have shown that intergroup contact does lead to a decline in racial stereotypes, provided members of the different groups have equal status within the interaction and interact in a cooperative way. According to your data, it looks like most of your interviewees believe in the validity of this theory, and that belief itself may well have performative effects

Nonna Mayer: What about discrimination towards immigrants, like Asian immigrants and migrant workers? What about the inter-ethnic relations? What relations between Ethiopians, Arab, Russians? Are there Israeli Jewish NGOs trying to work with Arab Israelis ?

Nissim Mizrahi: Migrant workers are an interesting example, as are Jews from the former Soviet Union. But the most important component shaping social boundaries among ethnic groups within the Israeli context is Judaism. Once you're accepted into the national narrative, you're in. The Mizrahi working class feels animosity towards migrant workers. This animosity is rooted in the attempted imposition of the notion of a global self, which devalues Jewishness, by the elite.

Hanna Herzog: If you look at the Mizrahi group, they are willing to participate to the nation. They are voting for religious parties. Jewishness is their only cultural resource available.

*On Michèle Lamont, Crystal Felming and Jessica Welburn's paper*

Daniel Sabbagh: First, according to your data, most African-American respondents believe in the importance of confronting racism and discrimination, and you argue that this belief is enabled by the widespread availability of a national script about the success of the civil rights movements. Still, from an historical perspective, this explanation raises a version of the chicken and the egg problem: the availability of such a script, which may then be used as a resource, is arguably a by-product of the willingness of other blacks in the past to confront racism without having enjoying this resource, and this fact itself would then seem to require another kind of explanation. In this respect, wouldn't you agree that your analysis indirectly underscores the *dynamic* component of racial change?

Second, you emphasize "the relatively high salience of shared culture in "folk" (...) conceptualization of blackness among African-Americans". Does your data enable you to more precisely ascertain what the content of this "shared culture" might be, or is it too elusive to identify? In particular, are you able to locate the positive component of a distinctively black culture that would be partly independent of the shared vulnerability to racism and discrimination experienced by American blacks?

Finally, in the paper you argue that "the development of collective strategies over individual strategies" would be "a clear advantage". A clear advantage from what point of view? Why this normative bias toward collective agency? What's wrong with purely individual strategies? Are collective strategies preferable because they stand as a more effective instrument toward the goal of racial justice or because they are thought to be valuable regardless of their instrumental

effectiveness, and if the latter, on what grounds? Would a black individual who does not feel any kind of racial solidarity and is only concerned with limiting the effects that his perceived blackness might have on his life chances, would that individual be doing something wrong? Would he be deluding himself?

Michèle Lamont: Yes, there is a bias. Individual strategies lead African-American who succeeded to think that the those who cannot consume are doomed to be “inferior”.

Crystal Fleming: On the issue of a chicken/egg circle in collective memory. The argument is not so much about the precedence of the civil rights movement. Those precedents created cultural repertoires that allowed Black Americans to acknowledge racism and then confront it, because they are able to perceive it. The mobilization is taking place in a national context in which categorizing racial groups was a normalized process. Being Black means having a shared history of oppression, which embodies a culture that's transmitted from generation to generation.

Alfio Cerami: What are the policy implications for this paper? What would you suggest to Barack Obama?

Michèle Lamont: We need to have public advertising. Defining collective identities is also done through communication. For instance, the Canadian immigration policy is much more welcoming. It is possible to use the state to create tools for affirming social recognition, for broader members of the collectivity. The state remains powerful in defining who we are. More inclusive definitions of who we are can be given through messages on television.

Nonna Mayer: This echoes strategies that we have in France for immigrant children. There is a definite achievement ethos, a success ethos. Do you really need to talk about “neoliberalism”? The strategies seen here also refer to good old American values.

Michèle Lamont: Is it neoliberalism? The tradition of the American dream heightens the privatization of risk. It emphasizes trends that are already there. At the same time, between the pre-1980 and today, there's a huge change. American workers never talk about solidarity. The breakdown of unions in the 1980s have had a huge impact on how we see solidarity. There is definitely a post-1980s era.

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### **Nonna Mayer, Michele Lamont** **Wrapping up intervention**

Nonna Mayer: The comparative and interdisciplinary outlook was interesting: we do not see inequalities the same way and reactions to them are very different. When looking at France, we see that the gini coefficient is 0.32 yet  $\frac{3}{4}$ <sup>th</sup> of the French feel strongly that they live in an unequal society. 13% of the population is beneath the poverty threshold. But 9/10 of people feel they could come under this threshold. When French people are asked that if you're poor it is because of luck or individual efforts, 70% of people say it because of luck. One thing is to think you have strong inequalities, another is to think that they're not acceptable. But what comes first in the list of unacceptable inequalities are access to health, housing, gender and ethnicity. A second finding is that politics and policies matter. Social welfare systems can also close up on themselves and increase inequalities. Our attitudes towards inequalities are shaped by institutions and policies. All this can lead to inequalities and the perception of inequalities can lead to politics: protests, riots, going in the streets.

Michèle Lamont: Different patterns of survey data show different patterns of boundaries and similarities. For instance, we notice patterns of “entre-nous” which are the complementary side of exclusion. Boundaries can be two sides of the same coin, with shared feelings of what's fair and what's not.