SEANCE ANNULEE/ REPORTEE
Quentin Skinner (Queen Mary University London)
This lecture focuses on a view about civil liberty that used to be widely accepted in European legal and political thinking but became largely lost to sight after the rise to hegemony of the view that freedom can be defined simply as an absence of interference with choices and actions. The lecture begins by outlining the earlier and alternative view that liberty is best conceived as the condition of not being subject to the power of others. This view is traced to Roman and common law traditions of thinking about the law of persons and related discussions about ‘fundamental’ rights. The lecture ends by considering how the re-appropriation and development of this earlier way of thinking might help us to think more fruitfully about some current threats to privacy and liberty.
Discussant : Yoel Mitrani (Sciences Po)
17.15-19.15
Sciences Po
Salle du conseil
13, rue de l’université
Paris 7