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## **Cities are back in town: the US/Europe comparison**

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From the integrated medieval European cities surrounded by walls, to the colonial Boston or the rapidly growing Phoenix, Las Vegas, or London South East, the category “city” comprises different density, borders and dimensions for instance : *the material city* of walls, squares, houses, roads, light, utilities, buildings, waste, and physical infrastructure ; *the cultural city* in terms of imaginations, differences, representations, ideas, symbols, arts, texts, senses, religion, aesthetics, *the politics and policies of the city* in terms of domination, power, government, mobilisation, welfare, education ; *the social city* of riots, ethnic, economic or gender inequalities, everyday life and social movements ; *the economy of the city* : division of labour, scale, production, consumption, trade..... Urban areas are robust beasts. Despite ups and downs, contrasting evolution over time, most of them have considerable amount of resources which have been accumulated and which, in due course, may be mobilised for new period of growth. This does not exclude period or sequences of rapid changes, but not so often.

Comparing US and European cities is a classic exercise of urban sociology. Urban sociology has long privileged analytical models of the convergence of cities, either based on models of urban ecology

inspired by writers from the University of Chicago, or in the context of the Marxist and neo-Marxist tradition that privileges the decisive influence of uneven development, and capitalism on social structures, modes of government, and urban policies. This tradition is well alive and constitutes an important body of research about global cities (Sassen, 1991), metropolis and flows (Castells, 1996). This implicit convergence is massively at play in the post modernist representation of fragmented incoherent urban space widespread all over the world (Allen and Soja, 1996). In theoretical terms, if the urban is growing everywhere, there are different types of urban models of cities which may differentiate, being different types of social, political, cultural, economic structures. That does not mean that all those models will not follow the same path to some extent. The comparison between European and American cities in this chapter is done in that spirit.

There is however now a clear move in urban sociology to deal at the same time with issues of convergence related for instance in one way or another to globalisation issues (see the excellent collection edited by Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000). Any analysis of cities face the challenge of taking into account at the same time the dynamics of the cities, often in comparative terms, at the risk of neglecting their profound embeddedness within national societies. Within the European context, the issue is particularly important as the category "European cities" was coined for the middle age period, but vanished later as national states became the main crucible for the making of societies, meaning national societies. For more than a century, sometimes much longer, European cities meant not much except the aggregation of Finnish, British, Spanish, German, Italian, Dutch, French cities. Only the making of the EU and erosion of national societies allowed the category "European cities" to make sense again (see Le Galès, 2002). European societies have been in particular characterised by the following features : the institutionalisation of the social and economic life, the importance of the state and the welfare state in particular, the territorialisation of the economy, politics and society. American cities and metropolis are by contrast part of the remarkable success story of the US over the past two centuries, part of a highly mobile and less hierarchised society where a powerful state has traditionally played a more regulatory role than redistributive, where privatism largely exceeds the public domain where the common good is more understood in terms of aggregation of individual interests rather than a more holistic general interest in the European context.

After comparing the making of the urban map in the two continents, the chapter characterises the recent urban growth but emphasises the contrasting dynamics of cities and metropolis. Two points are explored further, the economic dynamics and ethnic dynamics. By contrast, key issues of social segregation, social structure and urban politics are not addressed for lack of comparative data and lack of space.

Overall the paper argues that in US and in Europe, cities and metropolis are back in town.

## **I Robust ancient European cities versus dynamic American metropolis**

In the XIX<sup>th</sup> and XX<sup>th</sup> century, the contrast between “new America” and “old Europe” was particularly striking in urban matters. The understanding of cities usually relies both on the long term change and evolution on the one hand, massive surge and cycle of rapid growth on the other. Most sociologists of the time contrasted not only US and European cities but more importantly the new huge metropolis (US but also Paris, London, Berlin and Vienna) with the old medieval “European” city.

### *1. 1. Medieval European cities and colonial American cities*

The urban map of Europe has been mainly structured by three influences: trade led development of the middle ages and Renaissance, the State, and the Industrial revolution.

In the Western European world, cities emerged at the turn of the first millenium, insinuating themselves into the gaps of the feudal system. In ‘The City’, Max Weber portrays the medieval Western city as having the following characteristic features: a fortification, a market and a specifically urban economy of consumption, exchange and production; a court of law and the ability to ordain a set of rules and laws; rules relating to landed property (since cities were not subject to the taxes and constraints of feudalism); a structure based on associations (of guilds) and—at least partial—political autonomy, expressed in particular through the existence of an administrative body and the participation of the burghers in local government, and sometimes even through the existence of an army and an actual policy of foreign expansion ; citizenship associated with affiliation to a guild and with relative freedom.

The medieval city was the crucible of European societies, in which new cultural and political models developed, along with new social relations and cultural and organizational innovations, furthered by interactions between the various populations thus promoting mechanisms for learning a collective way of life, for innovation and spreading innovation, rapid accumulation, transformation of behaviours, interplay of competition and co-operation, and processes of social differentiation engendered by proximity. The Europe of cities was not just the Europe of early capitalism and of merchants, but also the Europe of intellectuals, universities and culture which launched the Renaissance. The current urban map of Europe massively reflects this Europe of cities which then grew progressively, and are even now at the forefront of urban growth in Europe (Le Galès, 2002). The great age of European cities and the relative stability of the urban system (what Cattani *et al.* call ‘meta-stability’) therefore constitute a specific feature of European cities.

**Table 1: European cities in 1400 (based on Hohenberg and Lees, 1992)**

City	Population
Paris	275 000
Milan	125 000
Bruges	125 000
Venice	100 000
Granada	100 000
Genoa	100 000

*1. 2. US colonial cities*

Urban US started with the first settlements on the East Coast. First cities emerged and started to develop with immigration and the early days of industrialisation. During the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the first American cities were organised by Britain, France or even Spain as part of their respective colonial empire hence organised around their military and economic requirements.

**Table 2 - 1820 : Five leading colonial cities**

New York	152.000
Philadelphia	65.000
Baltimore	63.000
Boston	43.000
New Orleans	27.000

British trade dynamism in particular guaranteed the rapid expansion of its American cities. New York had about 33.000 inhabitants in 1790, but 515 500 in 1850 and similarly Baltimore grew from 135.000 to 169.000. In relation to trade, wealth had accumulated over the XVIII<sup>th</sup> century and the Revolutionary war against the British empire was started and financed by the bourgeoisies of the main cities, Boston to start with. However, in comparative terms, those cities of a new country were far behind their European counterparts in terms of size and development....but not for long.

As Hutchinson and Gottdiener (2006) remind us, the colonial period had in particular three major consequences for American cities which sharply contrast with their European counterparts : 1) the absence of city walls i.e. the fact that location within and beyond the city was remarkably free of various constraints; 2) the absence of independent economic privileges or rights specific to the city and therefore the freedom for various groups to split for whatever reasons and to develop new settlements hence a pattern of fragmentation, privatism and weak political power attached to the city, to this day; 3) the crucial role of land development when land was so freely available and cheap and the competition between coalition or network to organise land development, a major source of wealth creation, a distinctive pattern of boosterism.

### *1. 3. Industrial development and massive immigration in Europe and US*

The Industrial revolution led to the formation of industrial societies and a new wave of urbanization. Concentration in great metropolises and large industrial areas lent a different dynamic to cities, changing them both socially and physically : a new type of industrial city emerged in the XIX<sup>th</sup> century—most often around coal mining, textiles, or iron and steel, then later chemicals, electricity, and mechanical engineering—enjoying an extraordinarily rapid growth fueled by immigration leading to very dense industrial regions and industrial centres in Britain, the North East in the US, the German Ruhr or the North East of France, “*Coketowns*” as Mumford put it. The “tyranny of fixed cost” (transport) also supported the rise of industrial ports, the creation of canals and railways, and the pace of concentration in large industrial cities both in UK and Germany, as well as in large US cities from the East Coast, such as New York, but most importantly the Midwestern great lake cities such as Chicago, Pittsburgh or Cleveland, Detroit. Cities became places where capital was tied up in major fixed assets, with labour forces that varied in composition and size, and with a high level of internal diversity. Phenomenal urban growth first in Manchester and then in Chicago made those cities the ideal types of this new breed of cities.

At the time of massive expansion of industrial capitalism, in two very different contexts, the making of the urban map followed very similar lines in both US and Europe, a mix of industrialisation and immigration. In both cases, the impact was massive in some part of the continent (North West of Europe, North East of the US) but was only one influence to have lasting impact on cities and metropolis on both sides.

**Table 3 : European cities during the industrial revolution (1850)**

City	Population
1. London	2 320 000
2. Paris	1 314 000
3. St Petersburg	502 000
4. Berlin	446 000
5. Vienna	426 000
6. Liverpool	422 000
7. Naples	416 000
8. Manchester	412 000
9. Moscow	373 000
10. Glasgow	346 000
11. Birmingham	294 000
12. Dublin	263 000
13. Madrid	263 000
14. Lisbon	257 000
15. Lyon	254 000

**Table 4: US 1870 : 6 big cities and 45 less important ones**

New York	1.478.000
Philadelphia	674.000
St Louis	311.000
Chicago	299.000 (but 2.702 million in 1920)
Baltimore	267.000
Boston	251.000

*1. 4. Development, diversification, specialization the rise of XX<sup>th</sup> century metropolis*

For observers of the late XIX<sup>th</sup>, early XX<sup>th</sup> century (Simmel in particular), the development of large cities, metropolis is a major phenomenon, both in Europe and then in the US, as centres of experiment of modern lives. Although this trend was at work in both continents, the major contrast remained central.

Capital cities in particular in Europe benefited from the consolidation of states, the shift of political life onto the national level, and the strengthening of the states'—and therefore the bureaucracies', including the army—capacity for control, as well as from industrial development and colonization. They

absorbed a large part of the flow of migration, thus providing sizeable reserves of labour. They were the first beneficiaries of the transport revolution, from tramways to road and rail networks. Open to the world in an era that saw increasing numbers of different kinds of exchanges, discoveries, and technical innovations, they established their role by organizing universal exhibitions and great fairs. Concerned with public health and safety, governments organized major improvement works, created wide avenues and constructed new public buildings: stations, squares and monuments that symbolized their dynamism and technical progress. These cities were also places of speculation, of public and private investment in housing, and of financial capital. Their cultural influence changed scale because of more rapid diffusion, transports and colonial empires. London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna in particular were the theatre of extraordinary physical and cultural transformations. As university cities and cultural centres they were the focus of unrest and the sites of the political and social revolts that punctuated the XIX<sup>th</sup> century. The great metropolis became the site of consumption, of department stores and wide avenues, of overstimulation which changed the urban cultural experience. This led also to physical transformation with the ever increasing diffusion of urbanisation around those large metropolis, hence the rise of suburbs, either working class ones as the red belt in Paris or bourgeois suburbs where middle classes abandoned the center.

**Table 5: Population of European capital cities, XIX<sup>th</sup> century**

	1800	1910
Vienna	231.000	2 million
Berlin	172.000	2.071 million
Prague	70.000	0.6 million
Paris	835.000 (1831 estimate)	2.888 million
London	959.000	4.522 million

<b>US</b>	1820	1920
New York	123.700	5.620.000
Chicago		2.701.000
Philadelphia	63.800	1.823.800
Detroit		993.100
Cleveland		796.000

Source: Moriconi-Ebrard (2000) and Hohenberg and Lees (1992), and Gottdiener and Hutchinson using Campbell Gibson (1998).

At that time, Chicago, Detroit or Cleveland are small places, under 10.000 inhabitants.

The figures give a sense of the phenomenal rise and dissemination of the large metropolis model which became an American feature: New York, Chicago and later Los Angeles in particular gradually replaced European cities in the urban imagination of the modernist metropolis. They grew thanks to stunning economic development and massive immigration.

## **II. Cities versus metropolis**

One way to think about urban development in US and Europe alike is to defend the idea of the end of cities and the triumph of urban sprawl, in other words the suburbanisation of cities and the urbanisation of suburbs, what Dear and his colleagues in Los Angeles sometimes call the Los Angelisation of the world (2000). This makes sense as suburbs are more and more diverse in the US and cases of sprawls are rapidly growing in Europe ... but that does not undermine the strength of cities. "Sprawl is a land development pattern that spreads residential units over a large area ... sprawl also encompasses the separation of residential from commercial land uses, the absence of clustered development of town centers, and reliance on the automobile" (Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom, 2004, p.59). In that line of analysis, the dissolution of the city is taking place within a large fragmented, chaotic, unstable urban world.

Let's first look at figures about cities and metropolitan areas in the two continents:

**Table 6: 50 largest US (2000) and European cities (2003)**

Rank	City	Population (Census 2000)	Rank	City	Country	Population (2003)
1	New York	8.008.278	1	London	UK	7.074.000
2	Los Angeles	3.694.820	2	Berlin	Germany	3.387.000
3	Chicago	2.896.016	3	Madrid	Spain	2.824.000
4	Houston	1.953.631	4	Roma	Italy	2.649.000
5	Philadelphia	1.517.55.	5	Paris	France	2.152.000
6	Phoenix	1.321.045	6	Hamburg	Germany	1.705.000
7	San Diego	1.223.400	7	Vienna	Austria	1.540.000
8	Dallas	1.188.580	8	Barcelona	Spain	1.455.000
9	San Antonio	1.144.646	9	Milan	Italy	1.306.000
10	Detroit	951.270	10	Munchen	Germany	1.195.000
11	San Jose	894.943	11	Naples	Italy	1.047.000
12	Indianapolis	791.926	12	Birmingham	UK	1.021.000
13	San Francisco	776.733	13	Köln	Germany	963.000
14	Jacksonville	735.617	14	Turin	Italy	921.000
15	Columbus	711.470	15	Marseille	France	800.000
16	Austin	656.562	16	Athens	Greece	772.000
17	Baltimore	651.154	17	Salonika	Greece	749.000
18	Memphis	650.100	18	Stockholm	Sweden	744.000
19	Milwaukee	596.974	19	Valencia	Spain	736.000
20	Boston	589.141	20	Amsterdam	Netherlands	729.000
21	Washington DC	572.059	21	Leeds	UK	727.000
22	Nashville-Davidson	569.891	22	Seville	Spain	695.000
23	El Paso	563.662	23	Palermo	Italy	689.000
24	Seattle	563.374	24	Genova	Italy	656.000
25	Denver	554.636	25	Frankfurt/Main	Germany	644.000
26	Charlotte	540.828	26	Glasgow	UK	616.000
27	Fort Worth	535.694	27	Saragossa	Spain	601.000
28	Portland	529.121	28	Essen	Germany	600.000
29	Oklahoma City	506.132	29	Rotterdam	Netherlands	593.000
30	Tucson	486.699	30	Dortmund	Germany	590.000
31	New Orleans	484.674	31	Stuttgart	Germany	582.000
32	Las Vegas	478.434	32	Düsseldorf	Germany	569.000
33	Cleveland	478.403	33	Lisbon	Portugal	563.000
34	Long Beach	461.522	34	Helsinki	Finland	549.000
35	Albuquerque	448.607	35	Malaga	Spain	543.000
36	Kansas City	441.545	36	Bremen	Germany	540.000
37	Fresno	427.652	37	Sheffield	UK	530.000
38	Virginia Beach	425.257	38	Duisburg	Germany	520.000
39	Atlanta	416.474	39	Hanover	Germany	515.000
40	Sacramento	407.018	40	Oslo	Norway	505.000
41	Oakland	399.484	41	Copenhagen	Denmark	499.000
42	Mesa	396.375	42	Leipzig	Germany	490.000
43	Tulsa	393.049	43	Nuremberg	Germany	487.000
44	Omaha	390.007	44	Bradford	UK	483.000
45	Minneapolis	382.618	45	Dublin	Ireland	482.000
46	Honolulu	371.657	46	Dresden	Germany	477.000
47	Miami	362.470	47	Liverpool	UK	468.000
48	Colorado Springs	360.890	48	Antwerpen	Belgium	468.000
49	St Louis	348.189	49	Gothenburg	Sweden	462.000
50	Wichita	344.284	50	Edinburgh	UK	449.000

Sources : US Census Bureau, [www.citymayors.com](http://www.citymayors.com)

**Table 7: 50 largest US and European metropolitan areas in 2000**

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Metropolitan area</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Rank</b>	<b>Metropolitan area</b>	<b>Population</b>
1	New York	21 199 865	1	Essen	9 962 743
2	Los Angeles	16 373 645	2	Paris	9 849 666
3	Chicago	9 157 540	3	London	9 160 487
4	Washington	7 608 070	4	Madrid	4 658 427
5	San Francisco	7 039 362	5	Brussels	4 423 523
6	Philadelphia	6 188 463	6	Barcelona	3 988 393
7	Boston	5 819 100	7	Manchester	3 976 124
8	Detroit	5 456 428	8	Milan	3 890 644
9	Dallas	5 221 801	9	Berlin	3 755 223
10	Houston	4 669 571	10	Athens	3 349 716
11	Atlanta	4 112 198	11	Rotterdam	3 116 490
12	Miami	3 876 380	12	Naples	2 973 487
13	Seattle	3 554 760	13	Rome	2 897 788
14	Phoenix	3 251 876	14	Birmingham	2 456 183
15	Minneapolis	2 968 806	15	Lisbon	2 344 824
16	Cleveland	2 945 831	16	Hamburg	2 195 830
17	San Diego	2 813 833	17	Vienna	1 928 221
18	St. Louis	2 603 607	18	Lille	1 800 000
19	Denver	2 581 506	19	Kortrijk	1 696 813
20	San Juan	2 450 292	20	Leeds	1 659 893
21	Tampa	2 395 997	21	Munich	1 576 104
22	Pittsburgh	2 358 695	22	Frankfurt/Main	1 439 695
23	Portland	2 265 223	23	Lyon	1 416 093
24	Cincinnati	1 979 202	24	Turin	1 400 320
25	Sacramento	1 796 857	25	Copenhagen	1 396 666
26	Kansas City	1 776 062	26	Marseille	1 354 571
27	Milwaukee	1 689 572	27	Stockholm	1 346 291
28	Orlando	1 644 561	28	Valence	1 332 319
29	Indianapolis	1 607 486	29	Glasgow	1 317 411
30	San Antonio	1 592 383	30	Porto	1 258 077
31	Norfolk	1 569 541	31	Stuttgart	1 210 544
32	Las Vegas	1 563 282	32	Douai	N/A
33	Columbus	1 540 157	33	Peruwelz	1 202 742
34	Charlotte	1 499 293	34	Newcastle	1 178 500
35	New Orleans	1 337 726	35	Amsterdam	1 158 310
36	Salt Lake City	1 333 914	36	Bielefeld	1 118 606
37	Greensboro	1 251 509	37	Seville	1 050 941
38	Austin	1 249 763	38	Helsinki	1 037 958
39	Nashville	1 231 311	39	Zurich	985 624
40	Providence	1 188 613	40	Dublin	978 282
41	Raleigh	1 187 941	41	Bilboa	944 527
42	Hartford	1 183 110	42	Florence	924 858

43	Buffalo	1 170 111	43	Southampton	904 278
44	Memphis	1 135 614	44	Nice	893 366
45	West Palm Beach	1 131 184	45	Mannheim	891 244
46	Jacksonville	1 100 491	46	Bremen	838 710
47	Rochester	1 098 201	47	Genes	826 163
48	Grand Rapids	1 088 514	48	Salonika	805 645
49	Oklahoma City	1 083 346	49	Oslo	778 998
50	Louisville	1 025 598	50	Toulouse	775 512

Sources: US Census Bureau, Moriconi-Ebrard (2000), Géopolis database.

### 2. 1. Contrasting urbanization in US and in Europe.

At first glance, two features make those two continents more or less comparable.

Firstly, both continents are now massively urbanised, more than 80 percent of inhabitants live in cities. As shown in previous figures, the dynamics was staggering in the US case while more progressive in the European case. For most Southern European countries and some Nordic European countries, the generalisation of urbanisation only took place in the post war period, while rural populations and interests were still very strong and organised. Secondly, if one takes as a measure, the number of urban agglomerations comprising more than a million inhabitants, one will find a more or less comparable number of urban agglomerations, around 35. However, this does not suffice, and those averages mask profound differences.

Europe and the US are distinct not only because of the “longue durée” of European cities but also the relative stability of the urban map made of medium size cities. Beyond London and Paris, other European cities of this size are rare. Thanks to their work in building databases on European and world cities (Moriconi-Ebrard 1993), Cattan *et al.* are able to highlight the factors that distinguish Europe. With a degree of urbanization comparable to that of the United States, Europe is characterized firstly by its very large number of cities and their marked proximity to one another: (Cattan *et al.* 1994: 23); secondly, by the fact that the major cities of Europe are not huge: large metropolises with a population of over two or three million are rare, and ‘if one compares the total number of urban areas of over 200,000, the average size is of the order of 800,000 in Europe, as against 1.3 million in the United States and Japan ... the top thirty American cities are markedly larger than the top thirty European cities’ (Cattan *et al.* 1994: 26); and thirdly, by the relative importance of small and medium-sized cities: Europe distinguishes itself by its relatively large number of urban areas of between 200,000 and one or two million. In 1990, the European Union contained 225 urban areas of 200,000 or more, forty or so of these exceeding one million and a very small number, two million.

Given that to some extent size goes with social, political, and economic diversity and complexity, these facts provide a very important contextual element for the analysis of European cities: one that is accounted for partly by the age of cities that came into being before the development of different forms of transport. The relatively stable core of Europe's urban system is made up of medium-sized and reasonably large cities, which are fairly close to one another, and a few metropolises. This importance

of regional capital cities, of medium sized cities (200 000 to 2 million inhabitants) remains a major feature of contemporary European societies (Therborn, 1985, Crouch, 1999). But are those features under threat?

## *2. 2. Cities versus metropolis : the Los Angelisation of the world?*

In the 1970's, cities, in the US and Europe alike many cities and urban areas lost population and were bound to disappear. Many prophets, including sociologists announced the end of cities as we knew it, the coming age of a post city era, or the final crisis of cities organised by capitalism.

The loss of population includes two different phenomena: 1) departure of population from both the city and the metropolitan area because of deindustrialisation for instance or the decline of the city because of suburbanisation and 2) the rise of the metropolitan area (case of Paris for instance, Brussels, Milan, Marseille, or Lisbon). Again similar dynamics in the two continents had very different outcomes.

"Born to run" Americans massively left the cities for the suburbs but also the industrial North East, when "born to stay Europeans" only left the more industrial cities to a lesser extent. Those individual choices are largely influenced by collective strategies: European Welfare states and urban policies contributed to the regeneration of quick growth of medium size cities when the absence of regional or urban policy and less generous welfare state encourage adjustments by mobility.

In the European context, the economic crisis of the 1970's marked the decline of the once symbol of economic development: industrial cities. Large scale economic restructuring processes took place the relative or absolute decline of the most industrial regions, particularly the oldest, and of industrial ports. UK northern cities in particular lost hundreds of thousands of inhabitants. The decline was even more pronounced in small industrial cities. All these have experienced the effects of deindustrialization, the urban crisis, loss of population (especially the most highly-skilled people), and the departure of firms, followed by attempts to renew the fabric of enterprise, either by attracting businesses or by creating them. (See the Urban Audit 2000). The scale of the urban decline was particularly massive in UK cities, in industrial Belgian cities, in the Ruhr Germany, in industrial harbours or in the industrial triangle of the North West of Italy.

However, this was not the dominant pattern of European cities : industrialisation and then deindustrialisation were important dynamics but overall represented a parenthesis in the structuring of urban Europe. The power of images of urban decay together with the dominance of UK literature gave the overall impression that cities were in decline all over Europe. Also, beyond the urban industrial crisis, the rise of post 68 anti urban ideology in the European greens and left gave rise to powerful images of the coming age of a post city period. Numerous accounts of the "end of the city" prophecy developed all over Europe, in the north in relation for instance with ecological disasters or the final crisis of capitalism.


From the 1960's onwards, the American debate on cities has also been dominated by the image of the crisis which links three elements. Cities like St Louis, Pittsburgh or Philadelphia have simply lost more than half of their population, a figure which in Europe is only comparable to the worse British cases of urban decline : Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, and hardly known elsewhere "on the western part of the continent."

Firstly, the image of the urban crisis was shaped by the series of urban riots in the 1960's in New York, Los Angeles and a few others. The obsession with race became even more central in urban America. The question of the ghetto, ethnic and spatial segregation of the black population became essential. Secondly, the industrial economic crisis led to the accelerated decline of industrial cities from the North East which has been underlined. The classic image of metropolis/cities in the US became associated with crime, social problems, violence. The departure or collapse of firms led to major financial difficulties epitomised by the bankruptcy of New York in the 1970's. Thirdly, the state supported boom of new houses in suburbs fed the "white flight", the massive suburbanisation of the US, what observers have called the rise of "edge cities". White middle classes massively left the inner cities and the metropolis for either the suburbs or rapidly growing cities in the south and the west, leaving the rustbelt. The cultural divide between city and suburb grew, and the political support for the needs of cities and their poorer inhabitants declined. After Nixon declared that the urban crisis was over, the 1970's and 1980's were a period of increasing cuts for urban and social policies, in other words another transfer of resources at the expense of the poorest.

The gloomy picture of the marginalisation of cities and metropolis remained both politically and empirically accurate in the 1980's in the US when booming cities were at last identified in the European context. By the 1980's, the remarkable revival of not only large but also medium size classic European cities and urban agglomeration, regional capitals for instance, in particular in the North of Europe, the Netherlands, part of Germany, France, Austria, and to a lesser extent in Italy, much later in the UK. On average, this dynamic was marked by one feature which confused many analysts: the growth concerned both the city and the urban agglomeration. In most cities, the urban growth took the dynamics of suburbanisation. However, in most cases the city centre also enjoyed growth, or gentle decline in marked difference with the UK and the US. Timing is essential here: by the late 1980's, medium sized European cities/urban agglomerations were enjoying growth and dynamism while gloom prevailed in the American context. In the US the 1990s presented the strongest urban growth in four decades (Katz, 2005). Urban America is striking back, for the first time in decades, the census showed the revival of urban agglomerations: cities are back in town.


The contrast is of course not just about the timing: the remarkable feature of Europe was the long term stability i.e. the revival of medieval cities or regional and national capitals with strong identification and public role of the city centre. By contrast in the US, beyond New York and Los Angeles, fastest growing cities and urban agglomerations are to be found in the sunbelt, Las Vegas, Austin, Dallas, Atlanta, Miami or Phoenix epitomizes the urban growth of sprawled, polycentric, low density cities.

**Fig. 1: Cities and suburbs population growth, 1990-2000**



Source: US Census Bureau, The Brookings Institution.

**Fig. 2: Population growth, 100 largest cities and suburbs, 1990-2000**



Source: US Census Bureau, The Brookings Institution.

Increasing urban concentration has been accompanied by apparently inescapable, unlimited dispersal into conurbations and into urban regions with fluctuating outlines. Cities have expanded, fragmented, and organized into networks like those in Northern Italy or the Netherlands, and this is said to be rendering traditional spatial representations obsolete. Many writers stress the unending extension of the suburbs, the development of 'non-places', (Augé, 1992) anonymously similar urban spaces (motorway slip roads, shopping centres, residential developments, areas of commodified leisure facilities, car parks, railway stations and airports, office blocks, and leisure parks), and megalopolises ('post-cities') in different parts of the world. In short, this is the time of 'citizens without cities' (Agier 1999), where new forms and experiences are being invented.

Physically, the medieval European city was characterized by: a citadel, an enclosing wall and a marketplace, a built-up area around a focal point, administrative and public buildings, churches, monuments, squares, areas for commerce and trade, and development radiating out from the centre revealing the centralisation of power, the relative integration, if not coherence of the city, unlike American cities, which are organized around a geometric plan. The medieval city evolved little by little, partly as a result of the development of such towns and partly because walls and identifiable town boundaries gradually disappeared to make way for faubourgs, i.e. districts beyond the walls, and peripheral urban spaces.

By contrast, the US model was constructed around the industrial city with its low-income neighbourhoods linked to manufacturing districts and close to commercial cores and its middle income neighbourhoods beyond. The theme of the physical break-up of the city is classic in the American literature, because of the exodus into residential suburbs and the decline of the centres of big cities. This vision of break-up has been strengthened by the political marginalization of cities, the creation of fortified districts on the margins of cities, and the development of secessionist movements, for example in Los Angeles or Toronto (Boudreau and Keil, 2000). In the American experience, privately owned, fragmented technical networks have promoted urban sprawl and the break-up of cities, giving rise to urban regions with several focal points defined in contrast to the city centre.

This built-up-town model, characteristic of the medieval city, has not remained unchanged. The logic of the metropolis exerted a strong influence on the way in which the urban space broke up and became increasingly complex. Revolutions in technology, starting with roads and railways, had an impact on the development of cities and the forms they took. Finally, every state made its mark, in the shape of public buildings, networks, forms of urban planning, and the development of forms of housing. It was a mark that varied considerably according to country: the ascendancy of the Jacobin French state, with its prefectures and stations, had little in common with that of the Italian or Swedish states. Despite these significant differences, the centre, whether historic or not, continues to hold meaning in most European cities and has preserved its historic influence—for example, as a place for citizens to gather at protest meetings. The way authority is organized also still has meaning in relation to the centre. European cities have remained relatively built-up in nature, even though important developments have taken place, and the imagined picture of the city is still a reality.

American cities were organised around a particular type of urban planning model “the grid”, with low density, essential role given to cars, zoning, and suburbanisation. After 1945, mobility became even more the distinctive characteristics of American within a dynamic society where the large middle class was in them making. The post war period marks the triumph of highways, trucks, flights air freight (Warner, 1985). Moving people and commodities became inexpensive. The rise of ports and trading centres in all four corners of the USA led to major urban development. Progressively cities in the West and the South of the US started to grow from Houston, Dallas, San Antonio but also Memphis, New

Orleans, Seattle and Phoenix and Los Angeles. The rise of a large number of widespread metropolises was accompanied by the dispersal of population from central city.

In the US, the 1990's are characterised by the following elements: sprawl, continuous decline of the poorest industrial cities and revival of central districts within metropolitan areas. Out of the suburban migration of the middle classes accentuated after World War II, emerged the prototypical metropolis with its central city ringed by suburban enclaves. In the best cases, the commercial core became dominant. In the worst cases, it along with manufacturing districts was in decline. The dynamics of development was horizontal, with activities deconcentrated and decentralized from the centre and the making of secondary centres in the urban region, hence the image of the polycentric metropolis.

The 1990s saw, as has been the case for at least 50 years, a continuous sprawl of metropolitan areas. A study of the 50 American largest cities during that period shows that they grew faster than in the 1970s and 1980s: 9.8 percent according to the 2000 census, whereas this rate was 6.3 percent in the 80s and – 1.6 percent in the 70s. Several cities, such as Atlanta, Chicago, Denver or Memphis, gained population after a decrease in the 1980s. Nevertheless, suburbs grew even faster: the population growth in the 100 largest cities during the 1990s was 8.8 percent, in the 100 largest suburbs it was 17 percent. In Atlanta for instance, the central city's population growth was 6 percent, 44 percent in its suburbs. The analysis of the 2000 census about US cities with populations greater than 100 000 also reveals that the median growth rate for cities in the 1990s was 8.7 percent, more than double the median growth rate of the 80s (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2001). Old industrial metropolitan areas with high unemployment rates are growing slower and have not yet entirely recovered after a period of economic decline. By contrast, the cities with less social and economic problems are growing fast: levels of residents' education and income are consistent predictors of urban growth (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2001). Also, foreign-born residents contributed to strong-city growth rates. Storper and Manville (2006, forthcoming), rightly suggest to distinguish two different processes : the coming back of metropolitan areas which had lost investment and population on the one hand, the revival on central cities on the other. The coming back of various groups within the central cities, enjoying city life was seen as a major shift.

### *2. 3. Europe: increase of sprawl but not the decline of cities*

The European context is made of few declining cities, many dynamic medium size and large cities, and two dynamic large global cities, whatever that means.

European cities make a fairly general category of urban space, relatively original forms of compromise, aggregation of interest and culture which brings together local social groups, associations, organised interests, private firms and urban governments. The pressures created by property developers, major groups in the urban services sector, and cultural and economic globalization processes, provoke reactions and adaptation processes of actors within European cities, defending the idea of a fairly particular type of city that is not yet in terminal decline. The modernized myth of the European city

remains a very strongly mobilized resource, and is strengthened by growing political autonomy and transverse mobilizations.

The long term meta stability of the European urban structure has been central in the making and development of European societies but that does not lead to a conservative view of the urbanity of the European city—balanced, welcoming, innovative, and dynamic, isolated from any restructuring of the labour market, from globalization processes, social conflicts, re-organized power relations, new forms of domination, deregulation of transport, telecommunications, and energy services, as well as from pollution and from persistent and developing forms of poverty. This stability goes together with its original structure (the high concentration of medium-sized cities) and the remains of its physical form. European cities (if we set London and Paris apart), although they are gaining more autonomy, are still structured and organized within European states—in particular, welfare states. The ongoing restructuring process does represent a threat, but—for the time being—European cities are supported and to some extent protected by the state, including in terms of resources. European cities are becoming more European, in the sense that the institutionalization of the EU is creating rules, norms, procedures, repertoires, and public policies that have an impact on most, if not all, cities. The EU also is a powerful agent of legitimation. By designing urban public policies and agreeing (under the influence of city interests) to mention the idea of ‘a Europe of cities’ as one of the components of the EU, it is giving a boost to cities to act and to behave as actors within EU governance. This also, to some extent, leads other actors—for instance, firms—to take European cities more seriously. Another point relates to their economic and social structure. European cities are characterized by a mix of public services and private firms, including a robust body of middle class and lower-middle class public sector workers, who constitute a firm pillar of the social structure. Despite increasing social tensions, inequalities, even riots at times. There is no ideal world of European cities but the remains of a less unequal social structure than in most cities in the world. The more important the welfare state and the scale of redistribution (North of Europe), the lesser the level of inequality and poverty. Both the form of the city, the existence of public spaces, the mix of social groups, and despite powerful social segregation mechanisms, and one can suggest the idea of continuing sense of “urbanity” still characterizing European cities (Zijderveld, 1998). Despite sprawling movements in most European cities, the resistance of the old city centres epitomizes their peculiarity. Lévy takes the example of large public collective transport (in particular the tramway) together with pedestrian areas and cycling paths to demonstrate the remaining strength of the idea of European city. Finally, there is a continuing representation of the city as a whole, Crouch (1999) suggests a “Durkheimian” view of the city which still exists in Europe. The increased legitimacy of political urban elites sustains and re-invents this presentation. European cities are still strongly regulated by public authorities and complex arrangement of public and private actors. European cities appear to be relatively robust, despite pressures from economic actors, individuals, and states (including welfare states) being reshaped within the European Union. Processes of exclusion, strengthening and transformation of inequalities, segregation, and domination are also unfolding in these cities. The development of residential suburbs separated from the city and of polycentric cities, the isolation of disadvantaged districts, the

development of cultural complexes, leisure facilities and shopping centres, as well as diverse cultural models and migrations, all clearly demonstrate the pressures exerted on the traditional medium-sized city. The urban regions of Milan, the Randstadt are good example of more polycentric structure and interdependent dynamics between the city centre and other cities. Finally—and this point is vital to our analysis—actors within cities have been strongly mobilized to direct the future of cities.

Yet, focusing on European cities nowadays goes hand in hand with analysis of forms of interdependence between scales, between levels of government, multilevel strategies of social actors and linkages between forms of mobility and local societies. It would be a vain exercise to work on European cities without applying oneself at all to the global strategies of major firms from private developers to utilities and leisure firms, to the transnational communities that weave links on both sides of the Mediterranean or towards the East, to the competition rules drawn up and then imposed in the European Union context, or to the restructuring of welfare states.

Since the mid-1980s, cities (those that are not old industrial cities), and above all the largest cities, have felt the full benefits of growth. In centralized countries, it seems to be mainly the region around the capital city that absorbs the strongest forces and the economic dynamism: this is true not only of London, Paris, Rome, and Berlin, the capitals of the leading Member States, but also of Madrid, Dublin, Stockholm, Helsinki, Copenhagen, and Lisbon. In the lower echelons of the hierarchy of cities, some regional capitals and other medium-sized European cities have also experienced strong growth: Bologna, Strasbourg, Lyon, Grenoble, Nice, Montpellier, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Nantes, Rennes, Munich, Cologne, Frankfurt, Geneva, Valencia, Seville, Saragossa, Norwich, Bristol, Swindon, Leicester, Turku. In some cases, however, economic dynamism has actually combined with population losses to release the grip previously exerted by certain metropolises, a development that has been particularly spectacular in Northern Italy, where medium-sized cities from Milan to Venice have seen very strong growth. A new feature has been that a number of cities have undergone economic development disconnected from the regions surrounding them. The movement of concentration/dispersal of activities favours smaller cities and rural spaces around cities. By contrast, others—especially smaller cities (which, from a French point of view, might be described as medium-sized cities) —are experiencing changes that tend more towards decline, as if regional metropolises in their turn are largely absorbing the economic dynamism of their region, as in Tuscany, Emilia-Romagna, Languedoc-Roussillon and Midi-Pyrénées.

### **III. Economic dynamics and social structure: the coming age of the global city?**

In both Europe and the USA, the gloomy view of cities of the 1970's is now changed in favour of "resurgent metropolis" and "dynamic cities." Two main factors have been put forward: the pressure of globalisation processes and the need for agglomeration raised by new forms of economic development. On both sides of the Atlantic, issues of social segregation and immigration are central in the making of the urban fabric.

### *3. 1. A new wave of metropolisation or the coming age of the global city in Europe and the US : economic engines of cities*

In Europe and in the US alike, the rise of what was named global cities (Sassen, 1991) associated to the rise of increasingly globalised capitalism became the new paradigm to analyse metropolis and their rise. Booming city centres, ambitious city centre redevelopments, most spectacularly in New York, the rise and fall and rise again of large scale office development project, booming house prices and office prices, demographic growth of the city centres, all those elements have signaled that something was going on in the largest and most powerful metropolis. Many observers have therefore taken globalisation trends and increasing networks and exchanges as the main factor behind the coming back of cities.

Urbanization is reaching new high in the contemporary world with the rise of mega cities beyond 15 million inhabitants such as Calcutta, Los Angeles, Cairo, Tokyo, New York, Bombay or Seoul. Beyond the modern metropolis, researchers try to make sense of those large urban areas: postmetropolises, global cities, global city-regions.

In Europe and the US alike, the first point which took the analysts by surprise in the 1980's was the rise of the largest metropolis, what became known as the global cities. Paris metropolitan area absorbed half the French population growth in the 1980's; London enjoyed accelerated growth while Los Angeles, Tokyo and more spectacularly New York enjoyed remarkable level of demographic and economic growth. The growth of those large cities was put in parallel with the rise of economic exchanges of the global level. Processes of globalisation, including transnational migration, architecture, financial transactions, transport flux, or dissemination of technological innovations contribute to the rise of mega cities in different parts of the globe. The traditional ideas of the city, the modern metropolis or the industrial city was therefore replaced by contradictory images of those mega cities where one either emphasizes cultural diversity and infinite range of interactions or the strength of control and capital accumulation by dominant groups. Those metropolises seemed to be reshaped by local groups and culture interacting, adapting or protesting against globalized flows. As symbol of the time, Shangaï with its extraordinary rapid growth represented the urban future in a somehow functionalist way of thinking.

In other words, within that paradigm, the urban world is becoming determined by globalisation trends and the rise of mega, hyper super urban areas for instance in our cases:

- The US East coast : Boston New York Baltimore, Philadelphia down to Washington
- The Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago area
- California, i.e. San Diego Los Angeles San Francisco, one could even go up to Seattle and Vancouver

In Europe too, some urban scholars also try to map out huge urban areas as the level of analysis such as

- The South East of England around London
- Paris Ile de France (some suggest to take the triangle London/Paris/Brussels as the right unit of analysis)
- The Delta metropolis ie the four cities of the south of the Netherlands
- Lombardia around Milan
- The Ruhr region in Germany

In principle, several consequences follow for our comparison :

- 1) Comparison between cities should be firstly organised around the issue of globalisation at the expense of the national framework. The same process is supposed play at full strength in different contexts.
- 2) Large cities matter, are the engine of growth, medium sized cities, in particular in Europe are being marginalised, they become museum of past histories (Castells, 1996). Urban Europe in the classic sense is bound to disappear.
- 3) Politics and classical social groups do not matter anymore, a new sociology and a new sociology is needed in terms of mobility and migration (Urry, 2000).

Their development is related first to the pressure and incentives of globalization trends. They are seen as the new motors of the global economy : issues of competitiveness are central to this notion. They result from the amalgamation of existing localities, to construct interterritorial organisation for collective action which are more or less functionally dependent. Some can be organised around a major urban centre as in the classic model of the metropolis, some may be the network of urban centres (Delta metropolis in Holland), some may go over regional boundaries such as Copenhagen Malmö or San Diego Tijuana. The basic argument behind this version of the mega city is from economic geography : those global city regions are the centre of dense networked of transnational firms, they “thrive on the productivity—an innovation enhancing effects of dense and multifaceted urban milieux that are simultaneously embedded in worldwide distribution networks” (Scott, 2001, p. 4). Administrative boundaries are of course becoming irrelevant.

The focus on global cities does not resist empirical analysis. There is no evidence so far of the making of a megacity within the European context beyond the cases of London and Paris. If one brings together series of cities in England, in the Netherlands, Benelux or the North of Germany, there is always the possibility to “discover” other megacities ... but that does not change the existing framework. Over the last two decades, there is no particular rapid growth of Paris or London at the expense of European medium size cities. The scenario of “obsolete European cities,” is not on the card, for now.

In fact, most trends characterising global cities are also taking place in most European cities. There is little evidence to suggest that, in the European context, global or world cities are a particular category of cities beyond the concentration of networks, headquarters, more diverse interests, more ethnic minorities fragmentation. In Europe, urban flagship projects are emblematic of this desire of cities to re-affirm their importance and to take their place in European and globalized networks, as witnessed by the rebuilding of the Potsdamer Platz in Berlin or the regeneration of the London Docklands, but that 's also true in most regional capitals in Europe. The contradiction of capitalism are more marked in global cities, there are more interests, less capacity to integrate, a fragmented governance (Préteceille, 2000, Scott, 2002).

In economic terms therefore, the rise of the so called global cities is rather to be related to the more general renewal and acceleration of metropolisation trends which are also valid for medium size cities in the US and Europe alike. There is indeed more to economic development than just the leading services, for instance the financial services. Following Veltz (1999) we would argue that dynamics of metropolization can be used to account for both the growth of a good number of European cities, notably regional capitals, and the effects of acceleration and accentuation of these dynamics in the largest of them. Differences are of degree, not of nature, reflecting hierarchies of cities. Many European and American are economically dynamic without being global cities.

What remains unclear is the extent to which there is a direct link between the concentration of headquarters, networks of various sorts, advanced services, diverse skilled professionals, knowledge complex and economic development or in other words, is there a clear size effect which has some impact on the rate of economic development? It may be the case that global city regions are the genuine motor of economic growth and that have a major comparative advantage. It may also be the case that different pattern of metropolization may lead to the same result because the combination of network, mobility, diffusion of innovation can take different form. The density of medium sized cities in Europe may be a functional equivalent for those factors identified in the global city regions to the concentration within a large metropolis. Some of the debate is a bit rhetorical when it concentrates on size and the location of network. Access and mobility are also central. Links between German cities or Paris and regional capital (around two hours journey for instance) are equivalent to a drive from the East to the West of Los Angeles for example. It may be the case that there is a distinct type and rate of economic development in the global/world cities, but that is still an open debate, at least within the European context. One suspects the dream of "one best way" which is often implicit in regional economist literature.

In a different way, the metropolis revival or growth on both side of the Atlantic is explained by the demands of the "new economy". Storper and Manville eloquently suggest that "the New Economy's demands for proximity are stimulated by information, which often requires that people work in close quarters with one another... soft-input economies are found more in big cities with diverse economies—precisely the sorts of places we see resurging. In such places it is the diversity of the economy that both sustains and is sustained by the easy movement of knowledge. Information spills

from one industry to another, create agglomerations in new branches of the economy; the talent and knowledge from Hollywood, for example, have flowed out and helped sustain LA's fashion, design and advertising industries (Molotch, 1996)." (Storper and Manville, 2005).

In that reading of the coming back of cities and metropolis, the level of education and available diverse skills has been seen as crucial. Cities are seen as "metropolitan hubs" as argued by Veltz in other words giant matrices for recombining resources in order to generate innovations. That works if the right sort of people and their interaction aggregate, exchange, combine.

As Bruce Katz points it (2005), the 1990-decade in the US was affected by major economic restructuring, mostly by the development of service-related jobs (19 percent of jobs in 1970, 32 percent in 2000). Education skills vary a lot, depending on cities and ethnic groups. The rate of adults with bachelor's degree is around 35 percent in Minneapolis-St Paul and Atlanta, less than 10 percent in Newark. Furthermore, in the top 100 US cities, only 10 percent of Hispanics and 14 percent of Blacks have college education, whereas 37 percent of Whites and 39 percent of Asians do. Besides, we can see a decentralization of work: one-third of jobs in the US are located in an area of 10 miles or more around central cities. On different indicators in Europe, the numbers of company headquarters have increased in two thirds of cities. The productivity gap in favour of cities in comparison to the national average applies more to Paris and London but is also true for many European cities. It therefore follows that from an economic development point of view, the focus on "global cities" may not be crucial to understand the development of cities on both sides of the Atlantic.

In the US, recent fast developing cities include not only Los Angeles but San Jose (Silicon Valley), San Diego, Seattle, Portland, Phoenix, Minneapolis, Indianapolis, Charloot, Columbus, comprising a mix of high tech, defense industry, tourism ... with low level of black inhabitants (Dreier, Mollenkopf, Swanstrom, 2004).

### *3.2. Segregation, gentrification, inequalities, race, migration*


Within the space of this chapter, there is no room for a detailed analysis of the social structure, and the key social cleavages, the dynamics of inequalities. Some major features are however briefly reviewed, the data available for comparison is also problematic.

A classic question is however : to what extent are cities/metropolis becoming more polarized ? "Polarization" refers to a process by which the poles of the richest and the poorest are reinforced at the expense of the middle of society, in terms of society's various inequalities (occupational, income, social mobility, and consumption). In urban sociology terms, this polarization can be observed spatially, in the reinforcement of the wealth of the richest areas and the poverty of the poorest areas. In the USA, large-city households represent a high proportion of the bottom tiers of the national income distribution, whereas only one-sixth of them are part of the nation's top income quintile. Beyond an inadequate 'dual city' model, areas of intense poverty and areas of intense wealth exist

and are increasing within cities, thus recreating a mosaic of spatial inequalities and conflicts. According to Alan Berube and Tiffany Thatcher (2004), census data on household in 100 largest American cities between 1979 and 1999 shows that large American cities can be divided into different basic household income distribution patterns, reflecting a more subtle reality than the “dual city model”

The proportion of households with high incomes declined in 79 of the 100 largest cities between 1979 and 1999, especially in the Northeast and the Rust Belt, where “stressed cities” proliferated the most. This fact confirms the allegations about declining industrial cities in those areas, in a context of globalisation and service-based economy. By contrast, 25 percent of suburban households occupy the highest-income quintile, even though the relative numbers of high-income households in suburbs declined (Berube and Thatcher, 2004). However, European cities saw the same social problems: increasing inequalities, rise of poverty level, housing crisis. As the *Urban Audit* shows it, around a quarter of European households have less than 50 percent of the average national household income. The average median weekly household income for the 32 cities for which data was available was 347 euros. The proportion of households receiving less than half of the national average income averaged at 23.2 percent, whereas 19.4 percent of households relied on social security.

**Fig. 3: Proportion of Households by income Category, 100 largest Cities, 1999**



Source: The Brookings Institution, Census 2000 data.

In general in the USA, poor people live in central cities, except in places like Seattle, Boston or New York, where low-income families are pushed away to the suburbs (Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swannstrom, 2005). In 1960, per-capita income for cities was bigger than that of suburbs. Today, per-capita income in cities represents 83 percent of the per-capita income of suburbs. However, this decline stabilized in the 90s. Miami, San Francisco, Seattle, Chicago or Atlanta reduced the income gap with their suburbs. At the same time, the geography of poverty in US metropolitan areas has shifted (Katz, 2005). The number of poor people in US metros has increased over the last two decades (19.3 million in 1980, 25.8 million in 2000). Still, poverty rates have gone down over the 1990s in central cities: 19 percent in 1990, 17 percent in 2002, while they have remained the same (9

percent) in suburbs. Although in suburbs the share of people who live in poor areas (suburbs with per capita incomes less than 75 percent of its metro area) saw a 10 percent increase between 1980 and 2000 (8.4 percent to 18.1), the number of people living in high poverty neighbourhoods declined during the 1990s (Jargowsky, 2003).

The pattern is more diverse in European cities. On average, poor people rather live on the outskirts of the city, in outer city developments because the centre has remained more middle classes and has benefited from high levels of public investments. However there are many exceptions. There are no clear patterns of poverty concentration in the Italian case, when in Brussels; the pattern is similar to the American one.


### *3.3. Immigration, ethnicity, race*

In the 1990's, more than 2 million people immigrated to just New York and Los Angeles. With the exception of London, there is no equivalent in Europe. On the one hand, immigration remains a dividing feature between European with regular increase of immigrant intake at a relatively slow rate and the US where cities, Los Angeles and New York in particular are boosted by high level of immigration. On the other hand what was once a massive difference also signals some convergence. In European cities, immigrants groups are now present in most cities and metropolis, politics of ethnicity is on the rise in many places, firstly in UK, then Northern European cities and gradually southern Europe. In that sense, the ethnic diversity of European cities progressively resembles that of American cities. Similarly, even in remote cities and metropolis, more diverse ethnic group are gaining grounds all over the US. However, urban politics is increasing defined in the US as the aggregation and coalition of different ethnic group to an extent which is not known in Europe (Jones-Corea, 2001).

Every European country has seen waves of immigration, frequently a long time ago, with their geographical origins often linked to colonial empire: Pakistan, India, the Caribbean, and central Africa for the UK; Indonesia and Surinam for the Netherlands; Italy, Poland, Spain, Portugal, then Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Black Africa for France; Turkey for Germany. For the traditional countries of immigration in Europe, the percentage of the population from abroad varies from 5 percent to 10 percent in the Netherlands, Germany, France, the UK, Belgium, and Austria. More favourable legal provisions and an unemployment rate that remained low during the 1980s have made Sweden the European country with the highest proportion of people from abroad (11.5 percent). In contrast, immigration is a recent phenomenon in southern Europe, but rapidly reaching similar levels. For the European Union, border closure policies have meant that the flow of immigration into Europe has stabilized at a level that is not very high and includes the immigration movements of highly skilled individuals, which somewhat blur the image of an immigrant. The high density and wide variety of immigrant populations is more a distinctive characteristic of the largest European cities, notably London, Paris but also Frankfurt (25 percent), Rotterdam (20 percent), Brussels (just under 30 percent of the city centre population), and Stockholm. However, immigrant populations in medium-sized European cities increased during the 'Thirty Glorious Years' from 1947 to 1976 and again from the


1980s, as well as with the increased diversity of their countries of origin. Although not a large-scale phenomenon, the presence of populations from abroad has become the norm for medium-sized European cities, even though, of course, there are wide variations. European urban areas, especially central cities have seen a huge flow of non nationals from outside Europe over the last few years (*The Urban Audit*). Around 10 percent of their residents are non-nationals, mostly (two third) from outside the EU. In over 90 percent of cities, the proportions of non-EU nationals have increased. Ports such as Liverpool, Rotterdam, Marseille, Genoa and Naples, for example, are cities that have long played host to immigrant populations. This means that, although cities that are now called 'global' are distinguished by a wide variety and high density of populations from abroad, medium-sized European cities are also affected, if to a lesser extent.

**Fig 4: Nationality in all Urban Audit Cities (% , 1996)**



Source: Urban Audit

**Fig. 5: Proportion of Nationals**



Source: Urban Audit

What are the implications for European cities ? Most of what has been analysed is more visible and seemed more obvious in the larger cities, in London in particular than in the rest of European cities. The concentration of the trend underlined seems to be clear although there is lack of clear comparable empirical data to be sure. However, most european cities are also concerned by segregation, rising more mobile middle classes, migration, cultural diversity social exclusion. From a sociological point of


view, there is not much of a particular social structure to identify the global cities. The main point remains a question of scale, of concentration and diversity of groups which make more difficult the question of integration, aggregation of interest.

**3. 4. Ethnic urban America**

American cities remain symbols of diversity and a harbour for hundreds of thousands immigrants from around the world. Most of the largest American cities are shaped by immigration. One of the conclusions we can draw from the 2000 census is an increase of diversity in metropolitan areas (Katz, 2005). Inner cities saw a dramatic growth of minority population, especially Hispanics (+ 42.6 percent) and Asians (+ 38.3 percent). Some cities like New York, Minneapolis-St Paul or Boston would have actually lost population without that massive flow of immigrants. This trend made the minorities a majority in the top 100 US cities: the share of white residents is only 44 percent in those cities, whereas white residents represented 53 percent of their population in 1990 (The Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, 2001). Almost half of the largest cities no longer have majority white populations.

Again, suburbs are also concerned by this phenomenon. The share of ethnic minority groups living in suburbia has grown significantly since 1990: 39 percent of Blacks (33 percent in 1990), 55 percent of Asians (51 percent) and 50 percent (46 percent) of Hispanics live outside central cities. Ethnically mixed metros like Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington DC, Houston and New York have the highest minority suburban populations. The number of predominantly white neighbourhoods fell by 30 percent in the 90s (Booza, Fasenfest and Metzger, 2004). Mixed white/Hispanic or white/Asian neighbourhoods are now the most common ones. 50 percent of suburban population live in “at-risk” suburbs, which are extensions of city ghettos, but often located far away from the city limits (Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swannstrom, 2005). Those “at-risk” areas are characterized by an important minority population, low racial integration and low tax bases comparing to rich low-density suburbs with commercial space.

**Fig. 6: Population Change by Race/Ethnicity, 10 Largest Metropolitan Areas, 1990-2000**



Source: The Brookings Institution, 2000 Census data.

### *3.5. New immigrants, new destinations*

As Audrey Singer underlines it (2004), not only the US foreign-born population grew in the 1990s, but also new destinations for migrants, mostly from Asia and Mexico, emerged: states like Colorado, Georgia, Nevada and North Carolina, or cities like Dallas and Washington DC. However, large metropolitan areas as New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Washington and Miami remain the main magnets for foreign migrants (Frey, 2003). They gained 3 million migrants from abroad between 1995 and 2000, but at the same time, those areas lose more and more residents (2.1 million), from various ethnic backgrounds, who move to other parts of the country. Western and Southern metropolitan areas (Phoenix, Atlanta, Las Vegas) attracted most of those in-migrants, who tend to move to suburban areas.

Another interesting thing to notice in terms of migrations and ethnicity is domestic migrations of black citizens (Frey, 2004). During the late 1990s, the South scored net gains of black migrants. At the same time, New York, Chicago, San Francisco or Los Angeles experienced the biggest loss of black residents. Atlanta and Washington DC have replaced California as the main destinations for black migrants, mostly college-educated.

### **Conclusion**

This chapters answers some questions of the US/Europe comparison but did not address all the key issues.

Firstly, the comparative analysis of European cities provides ground to support a view of the originality of European societies despite elements of diversity. The issue of cities of Europe and of European cities came back in the 1980's for two reasons. Firstly, the growing field of comparative empirical urban research stressed the growth and dynamism of middle size cities all over Europe, they were even booming in some cases such as France or Scandinavia. Secondly, it was related to the question of European societies emerged because of the acceleration of the political project of European integration and increased interdependence between national societies, and the vigorous development of European networks of cities. We argue that common changes within European cities, the impact of EU norms, the dynamism of horizontal networks of cities, the increasing urban tourism, the privatisation of utilities rather supports the view of the slow making of a European society.

European cities are characterised by the following features. They are part of an old urban system, constituted in the middle ages and which has remained more or less stable over time.. Both the form of the city, the existence of public spaces, the mix of social groups, suggest the idea of continuing sense of "urbanity" still characterizing European cities (Zijderveld, 1998). Despite sprawling movements the resistance of the old city centres epitomizes their peculiarity. One can take the

example of large public collective transport (in particular the tramway) together with pedestrian areas and cycling paths to demonstrate the remaining strength of the idea of European city.

Empirical elements we have analysed in this chapter show the specificity of European cities. Obviously, European and US cities share common trends in a context of a globalised capitalist economy: growing inequalities, segregation, increasing poverty rates, housing crises, cultural diversity, but also a coming back of cities symbolised by growth, metropolisation and economic dynamism. But behind those undeniable common points lie deep differences, generated by all the abovementioned historical and political reasons. European welfare states and regional policies softened the effects of industrial decline during the 80s, preventing the exodus of “born to stay” middle classes to the suburbs that occurred in the US, where “born to run” Americans accelerated the suburbanisation and metropolisation of their country. Inner cities, despite an improvement of their economic situation during the 1990s, remain symbols of poverty and social exclusion on the other side of the Atlantic, whereas old European downtowns have kept their economic and political leadership. Another example of these differences is immigration and ethnic diversity: even though many European cities have become highly multicultural, this aspect is – not yet ? - comparable to diversity in American cities, which growth is sustained mostly by immigration. Finally, European cities remain firmly rooted within national welfare systems, (on average, for the former 15 members of the EU, state expenditure still represents about 45 % of GDP against less than 30% in the USA, a massive difference in terms of public policies, employment, availability of social services, income redistribution through welfare mechanisms).

Secondly, our analysis does not provide much support for the “globalization leads to convergence” paradigm. For instance, the convergence of metropolis worldwide sometimes implied by the global city theory does not seem obvious after what we have seen. The national framework is still relevant in the European context, where medium size cities remain dynamic and have not yet become museums... In the US, the emergence of new urban magnets in the South and the West seems to contradict the idea that global cities such as New York or Los Angeles grow at the expense of smaller ones. Actually, cities of all kinds are back in town...

Thirdly, both the US and Europe are large unit with scope for diversity. Any systematic comparison is torn between the characterization of societies at that level, and the diversity it masks. This chapter does not avoid that trap.

Fourthly, both European and American cities/metropolis are part of a globalizing capitalist system. Without espousing the more functionalist views, there is a robust tradition of research showing the impact of changes on urban labour markets, the role of private developers and utility firms for the making of urban societies and cities. In the second part of the 1990's, the EU has played a decisive role to introduce more competition in different sectors : energy, transport, water, post offices.....More or less reluctantly, members states have had to adapt and to comply to this new set of rules. Large firms in those sectors have reorganized at a global scale and ferociously compete to buy or manage services and infrastructures in European cities. The change is even more striking for private

developers and nowadays for housing provision or privatization. The long term impact of those privatizations can take different forms according to the institutions within which they operate but it makes sense to imagine there will be some impacts in terms of inequalities, access to services, control and surveillance in the public spaces and capacity to govern urban societies. In political terms, a point which was not considered in this chapter, there is now sometimes in Europe the making of some sort of “urban growth coalitions” of private and public actors investing resources to promote growth in a competitive way. The parallel with US cities is both useful and misleading as the political resources of European urban elite make them far less dependent from private sector interests, but the priority given to economic development, large urban project, consumption spaces clearly indicates some common factors of changes. Cities do develop strategies on the “international marketplace”, there is clearly room for comparison there too (Kantor and Savitch 2002).

Fifthly, urban and ethnic segregation on the one hand, issues of poverty and upper middle class segregation on the other hand are still reflecting different histories and dynamics of social change in US and European cities. However, in terms of public policies and urban politics, similar conflicts of interests emerge : issues of gated communities, increasing competition between social and ethnic group, new inequalities, salience of the school issue, integration of immigrants populations. There is no major cities/metropolis in Europe where an ethnic minority mayor is likely to be elected in the short term and no urban politics looks like that of Miami or Los Angeles. However ethnic minorities are progressively becoming more active, organized and present in urban politics despite some fierce resistance, for instance in France or Italy, despite the extreme right vote in cities such as Antwerp or Marseilles or small industrial towns in the UK or in the North of Italy. More diverse, competitive cities/metropolis are on the rise both in the US and in Europe.

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