Nous vous signalons la parution d’un article de Sukriti Issar dans la revue Housing Studies, intitulé « Conceptualizing the connections of formal and informal housing markets in low- and middle-income countries » s’intéressant aux interdépendances des marchés de logement formel et informel à Bombay.
Résumé
In many cities in low- and middle-income countries, a sizable proportion of households live in informal housing. This paper proposes a framework for analysing the connections between formal and informal housing markets, both at the city-level in terms of the mechanisms that link the two housing markets, and at the individual-level in terms of the preferences of residents for whom informal housing is a possible housing choice. The framework identifies the mechanisms by which formal and informal housing markets are connected at the city-level, including competition, disamenity or negative spillover, and redevelopment or positive spillover. Informal housing in Mumbai serves as an empirical case to demonstrate the applicability of this framework. Results from field research suggest that the connection between formal and informal housing markets is dynamic – it can work in different causal directions, change over time and vary by scale. The preferences of residents in informal housing are diverse, and have varying implications for urban policy.
Nous vous signalons également la publication d’un autre article de Sukriti Issar, avec Matthias Dilling, dans la revue Political Research Quarterly, intitulé « Analyzing Failed Institutional Change Attempts ».
Résumé
Theoretical advances in the study of institutional change center around a productive paradox. While change agents can take strategic action to change institutions, institutions display a remarkable level of formal stability. From this paradox, we expect that attempts to change institutions are an empirical regularity and that many formal change attempts will fail. This article contributes to historical institutionalism by analyzing the political effects of failed formal institutional change attempts on institutional sequences. Failed institutional change attempts could be mere blips, having little effect on subsequent institutional trajectories, or even inoculate against future attempts. Failed attempts could also lay the ideational groundwork, aid in coalition building, and garner concessions for subsequent institutional change, or convince change agents to alter their strategy. The article suggests analytical strategies to assess the effects of failed institutional change attempts, drawing on examples from comparative politics and two extended case illustrations from Italian party politics and the Affordable Care Act in the United States.